Autonomous system
AS15934 ZEBRA-AS PJSC Rostelecom. Technical Team
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Zebratelecom
isp telecom business
The same reverse-name scheme written two different widths depending on which range the address is in.
What it's used for
- A provider's network, now held by a national carrier. Six IPv4 prefixes announced from the Russian Federation, no IPv6, eight thousand one hundred and ninety-two addresses, across two observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Eight of eighteen queried addresses answered. Five use a letter, the third octet, another letter and the last octet. Three use the same two letters but put all three leading octets, hyphenated, in the first slot.
- One of the eight inserts an extra label for static addresses between the host part and the domain, so three variants of one scheme are live at once.
- The netnames split three ways: a country code with the carrier's initials and a date, a country code with the brand in capitals, and a country code with the brand in mixed case.
- The AS handle carries the carrier's name with a full stop in the middle, then the words for a technical team.
- Five of the six prefixes are nested inside each other's space.
Interesting
- The two widths exist because the scheme was designed for one range, where the leading octets were constant and could be dropped, and then reused on a second range where they could not. The letters stayed; the amount of address they carry did not.
- A brand surviving in every reverse name while the routing record names its acquirer is the usual order of events. DNS is the last thing to be renamed because renaming it breaks things.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-21, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 6 prefixes · 8.19K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| RU | Russian Federation | 6 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS15934- Registry name
- ZEBRA-AS
- Registrant
- PJSC Rostelecom
- Abuse contact
- abuse@rt.ru
- Registered
- 2002-09-09
- Last changed
- 2025-04-15
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 3 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 4 authorising AS15934
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 3 of 3 announcements
- Route objects
- 14 naming AS15934
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-22. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere