Autonomous system
AS15886 REKKON-AS
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Konnektika
isp telecom business
The reverse names carry two octets out of four, and which domain they sit on depends on the block.
What it's used for
- A provider's network. Three IPv4 prefixes announced from the Russian Federation, no IPv6, five thousand one hundred and twenty addresses, across three observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Four of nine queried addresses answered. Each name is the last octet, a dot, the third octet, a dot, then a domain, with the first two octets left out entirely.
- Two of those names use a domain matching the AS handle; the other two use one matching the holder's company name, under a different top-level domain.
- The netnames are a country code, the company name, and dates nine years apart, so the blocks were taken at two very different points.
- One block's registry lookup failed, so its registrant and netname are unknown rather than absent.
- Both readable blocks list a private individual as the first registrant, with the company second.
Interesting
- Dropping the first two octets works because reverse DNS delegation already encodes them: the zone the query lands in is chosen by the block, so the name only has to distinguish addresses within it. It makes the names shorter and makes them useless if you see one without knowing where it came from.
- Two brands on two blocks, each internally consistent, is what a company looks like when the trading name and the registered name were never reconciled.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 2 downstream and 3 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS8732 | JSC Comcor | 177 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-19, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 3 prefixes · 5.12K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| RU | Russian Federation | 3 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS15886- Registry name
- Rekkon-AS
- Registrant
- lir-ru-konnektika-1-MNT
- Abuse contact
- support@konnektika.com
- Registered
- 2005-09-09
- Last changed
- 2026-05-26
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 3 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS15886
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 3 of 3 announcements
- Route objects
- 12 naming AS15886
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,783 prefixes, as published 2026-10-20. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere