Autonomous system
AS8732 COMCOR-AS Moscow
Unclassified RIPE NSP
Summary
Comcor (AKADO Telecom)
isp transit business legacy
JSC Comcor (COMCOR-AS, Moscow) — the operator behind the AKADO Telecom brand, which built and runs the Moscow fibre-optic network. Around 140,000 IPv4 addresses across 17 prefixes, and one of the most heavily peered networks in Moscow with hundreds of BGP neighbours.
What it's used for
- Metropolitan fibre, IP transit and corporate connectivity in Moscow. Every announced block is registered directly to Comcor (
RU-COMCOR-*netnames dating from 2000 through 2011), so this is genuinely its own space, not resold or brokered. - The reverse DNS that exists lands on corporate and institutional customers — a university's mail server, a firewall for an industry association, named enterprise hosts — plus Comcor's own gateways under
comcor.ru. There are no dynamic, DHCP or PPPoE subscriber-pool conventions anywhere in the sampled space.
Notable
- AKADO is a consumer brand, but this is not the consumer AS. Comcor numbers its mass-market broadband subscribers on separate autonomous systems (including an explicitly-named B2C one). AS8732 is the carrier and business-services side. Filing it as
residentialoff the AKADO name is the obvious mistake here. - The peer count is the tell: an operator with a few hundred thousand addresses and several hundred neighbours is selling transit and peering, not eyeballs.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 6 exchanges in 5 countries, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| DE-CIX Frankfurt | Frankfurt, Germany | 2001:7f8::221c:0:1 |
| AMS-IX Amsterdam | Amsterdam, Netherlands | 80.249.211.112 |
| MSK-IX Moscow | Moscow, Russia | 195.208.209.239 |
| Netnod Stockholm | Stockholm, Sweden | 195.69.119.200 |
| GNM Internet Exchange Ukraine | Kiev, Ukraine | 178.18.230.8 |
| Netnod Sundsvall- Gävle | Sundsvall, Sweden | 194.68.128.200 |
Transit providers
26 upstream, 131 downstream and 203 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 121 prefixes · 129K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| RU | Russian Federation | 122 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8732- Registry name
- COMCOR-AS
- Registrant
- AS8732-MNT
- Abuse contact
- netadm@comcor.ru
- Registered
- 2002-08-01
- Last changed
- 2026-10-09
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- COMCOR
- Also known as
- AKADO Telecom
- Network type
- NSP
- Scope
- Regional
- Traffic ratio
- Balanced
- Peering policy
- Selective
- IRR as-set
AS-COMCOR- Present at
- 6 exchanges
- Facilities
- 4 facilities
- Website
- http://www.akado-telecom.ru
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 6% valid · 1 valid, 17 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 2 authorising AS8732
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 18 of 18 announcements
- Route objects
- 24 naming AS8732
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 432 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere