asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15796 SALT-

Residential RIPE

IPv4 addresses 98.30K 2 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly CH
Exchanges 5 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 23 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Salt Mobile

Switzerland · AI-generated

mobile telecom isp business

Ninety-eight thousand addresses in two routes, one of them still named after the brand the company used to have.

What it's used for

  • A mobile operator's network. Two IPv4 prefixes and one IPv6 /29 announced from Switzerland, ninety-eight thousand three hundred and four addresses, across a hundred and twenty-nine observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • The whole IPv4 footprint is a /16 and a /17, announced whole with nothing broken out of them.
  • One netname is a country code and the current brand, with no date. The other is a country code, a previous brand and a date from the year two thousand.
  • The holder string prefixes the current brand with a country code before repeating the company name.
  • The IPv6 allocation is a /29, the size given to operators expected to number a whole subscriber base.
  • A hundred and twenty-nine neighbours is heavy interconnection for a network announcing two routes.
  • Six addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • Two routes for a hundred thousand addresses is the opposite of what most operators this size do. Every other network here is split into dozens of pieces; this one has kept its announcements whole, which is easier on everyone else's routers and takes discipline to maintain.
  • A netname is the only field nobody has to update after a rebrand, so it is often the last place the old name survives. Here it has outlasted two changes of owner.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 5 exchanges in 3 countries, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
DE-CIX FrankfurtFrankfurt, Germany80.81.196.56
LINX LON1London, United Kingdom195.66.228.109
SwissIXZurich, Switzerland91.206.52.26
CERN IXP / Equinix Internet Exchange GenevaGeneva, Switzerland192.65.185.240
Equinix Internet Exchange ZurichZurich, Switzerland194.42.48.41

Transit providers

23 upstream, 0 downstream and 35 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS174Cogent Communications, LLC34
AS3303Swisscom (Schweiz) AG30
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC28
AS1299Arelion Sweden AB12
AS34549meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG9
AS50304Blix Solutions AS4
AS1836green.ch AG3
AS17639Converge ICT Solutions Inc.3

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 2 prefixes · 98.30K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
CHSwitzerland3

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS15796
Registry name
SALT-CH
Registrant
Salt Mobile SA
Abuse contact
abuse-contact@salt.ch
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2025-03-31
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 3 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
56 authorising AS15796
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 3 of 3 announcements
Route objects
16 naming AS15796

Reputation

Classification and threat

Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 432 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check