asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15785 AS3326-INFRA AS3326-INFRA

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 4.35K 9 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 4 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly UA
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Datagroup

Ukraine · AI-generated

isp telecom business infrastructure

The reverse names give the router, the line card, the port and the sub-interface.

What it's used for

  • A national operator's infrastructure network. Nine IPv4 prefixes and four IPv6 prefixes announced from Ukraine, four thousand three hundred and fifty-two addresses, through a single observed BGP neighbour.

Notable

  • One answering name is xe-11-1-1.2.at.mx03.iev4.core.as3326.net: an interface type with three numbers for its position in the chassis, a sub-interface number, a two-letter word, a router name with its own number, a site code, and the word for the network core.
  • The other is lo0.rr1-ua-rtr.as3326.net, which names a loopback interface on a route reflector.
  • Both sit on a domain built from a different AS number than this one, and the AS handle repeats that same different number twice.
  • One netname names a third AS number that differs from the handle's by a single digit.
  • The remaining netnames run to five conventions, including one written in mixed case where every other netname in the record is capitalised.
  • One block's registry lookup failed, so its details are unknown rather than absent.
  • Of eighteen addresses queried, two returned a name.

Interesting

  • Interface-level reverse names exist so that a traceroute reads like a diagram, which is a gift to the engineer on call and to anyone mapping the network from outside. The chassis slot is genuinely useful and genuinely more than a stranger needs.
  • A handle naming one AS number, a netname naming another, and the announcement coming from a third is three generations of numbering in one record.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS3326PRIVATE JOINT STOCK COMPANY "DATAGROUP"1,399

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 9 prefixes · 4.35K addresses IPv6 4 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
UAUkraine13

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS15785
Registry name
AS3326-INFRA
Registrant
ASN3326-MNT
Abuse contact
ripe-abuse@datagroup.ua
Registered
2002-09-01
Last changed
2019-11-06
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 28 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
28 authorising AS15785
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 28 of 28 announcements
Route objects
29 naming AS15785

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check