Autonomous system
AS15672 TZTELECOM advertise with no-export community not available in all areas x7
Unclassified RIPE NSP
Summary
OOO Telecom TZ
isp telecom business
The AS handle is not a name. It is a routing instruction with a coverage disclaimer attached.
What it's used for
- A regional provider's network. Fifteen IPv4 prefixes and one IPv6 prefix announced from the Russian Federation, eighteen thousand six hundred and eighty-eight addresses, across forty-eight observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- After the company abbreviation, the handle instructs the reader to advertise with the
no-exportcommunity, states that this is not available in all areas, and ends with a letter and a digit. - The fifteen blocks use four different netname conventions at once: a country code with an allocation date on eight of them, a longer form naming a city on two, that same form without the city on one, and a bare abbreviation on the last.
- Every block's registrant begins with the registry's own name before the company's.
- The company itself is named on most blocks but is missing from the three that use the longer netname form.
- Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.
Interesting
- A community is a tag attached to a route that asks the receiving network to treat it a certain way. Putting that request in the handle means it reaches anyone reading the registry and no router at all, which is the wrong place for it by one whole layer.
- Four netname conventions across fifteen blocks is what a decade of separate allocations looks like when nobody goes back to normalise the earlier ones.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| MSK-IX Moscow | Moscow, Russia | 195.208.209.111 |
Transit providers
11 upstream, 7 downstream and 24 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 14 prefixes · 18.43K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| RU | Russian Federation | 15 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS15672- Registry name
- TZTELECOM
- Registrant
- OOO Telecom TZ
- Abuse contact
- abuse@tz.ru
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2026-08-25
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- OOO Telecom TZ
- Also known as
- ООО "Телком ТЗ"
- Network type
- NSP
- Scope
- Regional
- Traffic ratio
- Mostly Inbound
- Peering policy
- Open
- IRR as-set
AS-TZTELECOM- Present at
- 4 exchanges
- Website
- http://www.tz.ru/
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 82 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS15672
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 82 of 82 announcements
- Route objects
- 90 naming AS15672
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere