Autonomous system
AS15633 UOC-AS
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya
education research infrastructure
The registry itself is listed as the abuse contact, because the holder never named one.
What it's used for
- An open university's network. One IPv4
/19announced from Spain, no IPv6, eight thousand addresses, across two observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- The block's second registrant is the registry's own abuse handling role rather than anyone at the university, which is what appears when a holder leaves that field to the default.
- The netname is the country code, a four-letter acronym and an allocation date, following the convention exactly.
- Eight thousand addresses are announced as a single route with no more specific pieces.
- No IPv6 is announced.
- Three addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.
Interesting
- An abuse report about this network goes to the registry, which forwards it or does not. That is one more hop and one more delay than a directly named contact, and it is a common default.
- A single route for the whole holding is the tidiest possible announcement. It also means the university has never needed to steer traffic to part of its space separately.
- No IPv6 from a university is unusual, since research and education networks were generally among the first to deploy it.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-25, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 8.19K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| ES | Spain | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS15633- Registry name
- UOC-AS
- Registrant
- AS15633-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@uoc.edu
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2017-11-15
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- UOC-AS
- Scope
- Not Disclosed
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 3 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS15633
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 67% registered · 2 of 3 announcements
- Route objects
- 3 naming AS15633
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 443 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-24. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere