Autonomous system
AS13041 CESCA-AC
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
CSUC
education research infrastructure
A university consortium whose registry records point abuse handling at a named incident response team.
What it's used for
- The Catalan universities' shared services consortium, carrying its member institutions. 311,808 addresses across eight IPv4 prefixes, two IPv6 prefixes, and 12 observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Three blocks are the consortium's own, netname
ES-CESCA-20040402, plusCESCANET. - The rest are members', each with its own netname and registrant:
UPCNET,XIUAB,UBNETandIFAENET. - Most blocks list
IRT-CESCA-CSIRTamong their registry contacts. - One of 18 sampled addresses returned a name:
alba-ip.cells.es.
Interesting
IRT-CESCA-CSIRTis a registry object type built specifically to carry incident response contacts, referenced from the address blocks it covers rather than duplicated into each. It means a report about any member university's address reaches one shared security team. Very few networks in this range use it; most fall back to a generic abuse address.- Four member networks keep their own netnames and their own registrants under one AS number. The consortium routes for them without absorbing their records, so the registry still shows which university holds which block.
- The single hostname that answered belongs to a research facility rather than a university, which is what shared academic infrastructure looks like from outside: the addresses are the consortium's, the machines are whoever needs them.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Catalunya Neutral Internet Exchange Point | Barcelona, Spain | 193.242.98.38 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 8 prefixes · 312K addresses IPv6 2 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| ES | Spain | 10 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS13041- Registry name
- CESCA-AC
- Registrant
- CESCA-MNT
- Abuse contact
- eriac@csuc.cat
- Registered
- 2002-04-24
- Last changed
- 2025-07-21
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 60% valid · 6 valid, 4 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 5 authorising AS13041
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 10 of 10 announcements
- Route objects
- 12 naming AS13041
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere