asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15606 NASK-DNS-ANYCAST

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 256 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly PL
Exchanges 3 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 20 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

NASK DNS anycast

Poland · AI-generated

infrastructure research government measurement

One /24 and one hundred and nineteen neighbours: this is a network announced from many places at once.

What it's used for

  • Anycast name service for a national academic network operator. One IPv4 /24 and one IPv6 /48 announced from Poland, two hundred and fifty-six addresses, across one hundred and nineteen observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • The AS handle, the netname and the holder record all say the same thing: this number exists to carry name service, and the word anycast is written into each of them.
  • One hundred and nineteen neighbours behind two hundred and fifty-six addresses is the highest ratio of connections to addresses in this part of the number range.
  • The holder is a national research institute, named in full in capitals with no abbreviation.
  • The registrant list is that institute and its registry role, with no third party involved.
  • Three addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • Anycast works by announcing the same small block from many separate locations, so queries land at whichever copy is nearest. The neighbour count is the footprint: each connection is another place the service answers from.
  • A dedicated AS number for one function is good practice for name service. It keeps the announcement independent of the rest of the organisation's routing and makes it obvious when it disappears.
  • Two hundred and fifty-six addresses is more than enough. A resolver service needs a handful of addresses and a great many places to put them.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 3 exchanges in 3 countries, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
DE-CIX FrankfurtFrankfurt, Germany80.81.192.188
LINX LON1London, United Kingdom195.66.225.168
TPIX - Internet ExchangeWarsaw, Poland195.149.233.240

Transit providers

20 upstream, 0 downstream and 29 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC33
AS31229Beyond.pl sp. z o.o.27
AS1887PANSTWOWY INSTYTUT BADAWCZY13
AS34549meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG4
AS24482SG.GS2
AS48185team.blue NV2
AS48362Stadtwerke Feldkirch2
AS50300CustodianDC Limited2

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-19, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
PLPoland2

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS15606
Registry name
NASK-DNS-ANYCAST
Registrant
NASK-ENUM-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@nask.pl
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2019-11-25
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 2 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
2 authorising AS15606
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
Route objects
3 naming AS15606

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,783 prefixes, as published 2026-10-20. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check