Autonomous system
AS15377 FREGAT
Residential RIPE
Summary
Fregat
isp telecom infrastructure
The reverse names are the access protocol's own name, under two unrelated domains.
What it's used for
- An internet provider. Fifteen IPv4 prefixes and one IPv6
/29announced from Ukraine, ninety-six thousand addresses, across twenty observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Three answering addresses return names whose first label is the dial-up-descended access protocol used to authenticate broadband subscribers, spelled with its usual mixed capitals.
- Two of those names sit under the provider's brand domain and one under a different domain entirely, three letters that appear nowhere else in the record.
- Six blocks carry a bare netname of country code plus company name; seven more add the allocation date, and those dates span nearly two decades.
- The largest announcement is a
/16, sixty-five thousand addresses in one route. - Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and three returned a name.
Interesting
- A protocol name as a hostname tells you how subscribers connect but nothing about which subscriber it is. That is a reasonable privacy outcome reached for engineering reasons rather than policy ones.
- The second domain is the more useful signal. It suggests a network absorbed from another operator whose reverse zone came along with the addresses.
- The AS handle names a brand that the registrant does not, so the company trades under one name and registers under another.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Giganet Internet Exchange | Kyiv, Ukraine | 185.1.62.17 |
Transit providers
7 upstream, 2 downstream and 13 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-15, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 15 prefixes · 96.51K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| UA | Ukraine | 16 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS15377- Registry name
- FREGAT
- Registrant
- lir-ua-traditional-1-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@fregat.net
- Registered
- 2002-06-12
- Last changed
- 2026-06-16
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 16 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 16 authorising AS15377
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 16 of 16 announcements
- Route objects
- 16 naming AS15377
Reputation
Classification and threat
Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,782 prefixes, as published 2026-10-16. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere