asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15366 DNSNET German Internet Service Providers

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 30.72K 6 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly DE
Exchanges 5 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 23 1 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

DNS:NET Internet Service

Germany · AI-generated

isp telecom infrastructure

A company name with a colon in it, and five blocks named after a company that no longer holds them.

What it's used for

  • A regional internet provider. Six IPv4 prefixes and one IPv6 /29 announced from Germany, thirty thousand addresses, across one hundred and thirteen observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • The holder's name contains a colon, punctuation that is legal in a company name and awkward everywhere else, and the two halves of it are both protocol words.
  • Five netnames share a prefix naming a different company, each followed by the date the block was allocated: one written as six digits and four as eight.
  • The sixth netname is the company's own name plus the word dialin, a product that predates broadband.
  • Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.
  • One hundred and thirteen neighbours is a peering count, not a transit count.

Interesting

  • That neighbour count against thirty thousand addresses is the shape of a provider that peers widely at exchanges rather than buying transit from a few carriers. It is how regional providers in this market keep costs down.
  • Dates baked into netnames are unintended documentation. They record when each block was handed out, and the two formats show the convention changed partway through.
  • A provider serving broadband subscribers usually names its customer addresses in reverse. None of the sampled addresses answered at all, which is unusual at this size.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 5 exchanges in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
DE-CIX FrankfurtFrankfurt, Germany80.81.194.30
DE-CIX DusseldorfDüsseldorf, Germany185.1.170.194
DE-CIX MunichMunich, Germany185.1.208.169
DE-CIX HamburgHamburg, Germany185.1.210.175
Berlin Commercial Internet ExchangeBerlin, Germany193.178.185.16

Transit providers

23 upstream, 1 downstream and 39 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS3356Level 3 Parent, LLC118
AS1299Arelion Sweden AB89
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC50
AS3320Deutsche Telekom AG26
AS34549meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG19
AS33891Core-Backbone GmbH12
AS1836green.ch AG7
AS24482SG.GS7

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 6 prefixes · 30.72K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
DEGermany7

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS15366
Registry name
DNSNET
Registrant
DNSNET-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@dns-net.de
Registered
2002-08-29
Last changed
2017-11-15
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 7 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS15366
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 7 of 7 announcements
Route objects
19 naming AS15366

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check