Autonomous system
AS15305 SYRINGANETWORKS
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
Syringa Networks
isp telecom transit infrastructure
Sixty-six neighbours, customer telephone companies numbered in the netnames, and one reverse name pointing at the wrong address.
What it's used for
- A regional carrier. Forty-one IPv4 prefixes and two IPv6 prefixes announced from the United States, thirty-three thousand addresses in total, across sixty-six observed neighbours.
Notable
- One sampled reverse name encodes an address in a completely different block from the one that answered, so the record and the address disagree.
- Customer blocks are registered to rural telephone companies under netnames built from a three letter prefix, a five digit zero padded customer number such as
00328or00238, and the address. - The carrier's own netnames come in three forms: the full company name, the same with the address appended, and
SYRI, four letters. - Most registrant fields list the company plus a hostmaster, a network operations centre and an abuse desk, the most complete contact set in this range.
- A second domain appears in reverse DNS for the wireless side of the business.
Interesting
- The mismatched reverse name is the kind of error that survives for years. It resolves, it looks plausible, and anyone reading logs will place that address in the wrong part of the network.
- Numbering customers in the netname turns the registry into a billing index. It is efficient and it quietly publishes how many customers came before this one.
- Sixty-six neighbours on thirty-three thousand addresses is a carrier whose business is reaching places other networks do not, rather than carrying volume.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 10 exchanges in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Equinix Internet Exchange Ashburn | Ashburn, United States | 206.126.236.196 |
| Seattle Internet Exchange | Seattle, United States | 206.81.80.239 |
| Coresite - Any2 West | Los Angeles, United States | 206.72.211.20 |
| Any2 California | Los Angeles, United States | 206.72.211.20 |
| Equinix Internet Exchange Chicago | Chicago, United States | 208.115.136.4 |
| Equinix Internet Exchange Dallas | Dallas, United States | 206.223.118.199 |
| Equinix Internet Exchange San Jose (Bay Area) | San Jose, United States | 206.223.116.122 |
| Northwest Access Exchange | Portland, United States | 198.32.195.72 |
Transit providers
6 upstream, 54 downstream and 75 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 41 prefixes · 33.54K addresses IPv6 2 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| US | United States of America | 43 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS15305- Registry name
- SYRINGANETWORKS
- Registrant
- Syringa Networks, LLC
- Abuse contact
- abuse@syringanetworks.net
- Registered
- 2000-04-14
- Last changed
- 2012-03-02
- Allocation
- assigned
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 4% valid · 1 valid, 26 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 2 authorising AS15305
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 93% registered · 25 of 27 announcements 1 other origin
- Route objects
- 51 naming AS15305
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 440 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere