asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS13215 CPLUS1-AS

Residential RIPE Cable/DSL/ISP

IPv4 addresses 1.54K 3 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 30 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly RU
Exchanges 1 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 11 1 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Convey Plus

Russian Federation · AI-generated

telecom isp hosting

Thirty IPv6 announcements against three IPv4 prefixes, doubling in size at every step.

What it's used for

  • A telecommunications company in the Russian Federation. 1,536 addresses across three IPv4 prefixes, thirty IPv6 prefixes, and 23 observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • The IPv6 list runs 2a0b:a8c0:4::/46, 8::/45, 10::/44, 20::/43, 40::/42, 80::/41, 100::/40, 200::/39, each twice the previous.
  • IPv4 is 185.97.164.0/22 plus two /24s, netnames RU-CONVEYPLUS-20150423 and CONVEYPLUS.
  • Two blocks list Abuse OBL as the only contact.
  • Nine addresses were sampled and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • Ten times as many IPv6 announcements as IPv4 ones, on a network with 1,536 IPv4 addresses. The cascade of doubling prefix sizes is a range splitter covering an interval whose edges do not land on a single boundary, and each piece costs everyone else a routing table entry.
  • This is now a recurring shape across this range rather than one operator's quirk. The same arithmetic signature appears wherever an operator announces a sub-range of its own allocation through tooling instead of by hand.
  • 23 neighbours on a small network is peering-led connectivity, and the mismatch between that and the address count is the usual sign of a business selling paths rather than space.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
MSK-IX St. PetersburgSt. Petersburg, Russia194.226.102.45

Transit providers

11 upstream, 1 downstream and 13 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS35598INETCOM CARRIER LLC203
AS31133PJSC MegaFon94
AS12389PJSC Rostelecom62
AS57304JSC "RetnNet"59
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC19
AS62255BiMajLink d.o.o.15
AS9002RETN Limited7
AS24482SG.GS7

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-28, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 3 prefixes · 1.54K addresses IPv6 30 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
RURussian Federation33

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS13215
Registry name
CPLUS1-AS
Registrant
CPLUS1-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@cplus.ru
Registered
2001-09-24
Last changed
2026-03-27
Allocation
allocated

Declared

PeeringDB profile

self-reported
Name
Convey Plus
Network type
Cable/DSL/ISP
Scope
Europe
Traffic ratio
Balanced
Peering policy
Open
IRR as-set
AS-CONVEYPLUS
Present at
5 exchanges
Facilities
1 facilities
Website
http://cplus.ru/

PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
75% valid · 6 valid, 2 with no ROA
ROAs
7 authorising AS13215
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 8 of 8 announcements
Route objects
14 naming AS13215

Reputation

Classification and threat

Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 448 networks and 1,851 prefixes, as published 2026-10-29. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check