Autonomous system
AS13095 CTK-NET-AS
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
CTK-NET
isp telecom business
Three company names in one record: one in the handle, one in the holder, one in the netname.
What it's used for
- A Russian network operated by a national telecommunications group. 8,192 addresses in one IPv4 prefix, one observed BGP neighbour, and no IPv6 announced.
Notable
- The AS handle is
CTK-NET-AS; the holder is a different company again; the netname isRU-SOVINTEL-20000316, a third. - The same third name appears twice more, in the network operations and abuse contacts.
- The single prefix is
213.150.64.0/19. - Three addresses were sampled and none returned a name.
Interesting
- Three names is a merger chain written into three fields that update at different rates. The netname and its contacts are the oldest and have never been touched; the holder field was rewritten when the company changed hands; the handle preserves whatever the network called itself when the number was issued. Read together they give the sequence of ownership that no single field records.
- The netname date sits within weeks of the block being registered, and the operator whose name it carries has not existed independently for many years. Netnames are effectively permanent, which makes them the most reliable dating evidence in the registry and the least reliable ownership evidence.
- A single /19 behind one neighbour is a regional piece of a much larger network, reachable only through its own parent.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS8402 | PJSC "Vimpelcom" | 59 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-22, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 8.19K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| RU | Russian Federation | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS13095- Registry name
- CTK-NET-AS
- Registrant
- PJSC "Vimpelcom"
- Abuse contact
- abuse-b2b@beeline.ru
- Registered
- 2002-08-12
- Last changed
- 2017-11-15
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 1 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS13095
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
- Route objects
- 7 naming AS13095
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-23. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere