asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS13000 LEON-AS

Residential RIPE

IPv4 addresses 50.43K 34 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 32 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly PL
Exchanges 4 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 21 6 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Leon

Poland · AI-generated

isp telecom business

A regional Polish provider carrying an absorbed competitor's netname alongside its own.

What it's used for

  • A Polish internet provider serving the south of the country. 50,432 addresses across 34 IPv4 prefixes, 32 IPv6 prefixes, and 98 observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • Most blocks share one netname, PL-LEON-20090506, reused across at least six separate prefixes.
  • Two others are bare LEON, and one is ERTEL-NET.
  • Eleven of eighteen sampled addresses answered, all in the form static-188-137-47-255.leon.com.pl.
  • First observed in the routing archive in August 2000.

Interesting

  • One dated netname covering six prefixes means a single allocation was carved up and each piece announced separately, rather than six allocations being made over time. The date is the day the block was assigned, so every piece of it carries the same one no matter when it was routed.
  • ERTEL-NET is a different company's name on a block registered to this one. Regional providers grow by buying their neighbours, and the netname is the part of the acquisition nobody bothers to rewrite, so it stays as a marker of who held the space first.
  • Every answering address is labelled static, which distinguishes fixed customer assignments from the dynamic pool. Networks that publish this are telling anyone who looks which addresses belong to a business line, and that distinction matters to mail filters far more than to users.
  • Thirty-two IPv6 prefixes against 34 IPv4 ones is near parity, unusual for a provider this size and a sign the deployment was done properly rather than as a token announcement.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 4 exchanges in 3 countries, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
DE-CIX FrankfurtFrankfurt, Germany80.81.195.93
AMS-IX AmsterdamAmsterdam, Netherlands80.249.214.137
TPIX - Internet ExchangeWarsaw, Poland195.149.232.88
Thinx IXWarsaw, Poland212.91.0.219

Transit providers

21 upstream, 6 downstream and 39 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC1,229
AS15744Silesian University of Technology, Computer Centre138
AS5617Orange Polska Spolka Akcyjna58
AS33891Core-Backbone GmbH55
AS24482SG.GS42
AS5405Inter.link GmbH36
AS24748Atman Sp. z o.o.21
AS12552GlobalConnect AB19

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 34 prefixes · 50.43K addresses IPv6 32 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
PLPoland66

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS13000
Registry name
LEON-AS
Registrant
LEON-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@leon.pl
Registered
2005-12-08
Last changed
2018-09-04
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
98% valid · 41 valid, 1 with no ROA
ROAs
20 authorising AS13000
ASPA
1 declared providers
IRR
100% registered · 42 of 42 announcements
Route objects
45 naming AS13000

Reputation

Classification and threat

Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check