Autonomous system
AS12997 KTNET
Unclassified RIPE NSP
Summary
Kyrgyztelecom
telecom isp infrastructure
A national operator whose reverse names are generated from the address, except for the one that isn't.
What it's used for
- The national telecommunications operator of Kyrgyzstan. 82,944 addresses across 15 IPv4 prefixes, one IPv6 prefix, and three observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Every block carries a
KG-KT-netname with its date:20050202,20060713,20080522,20090529,20101206,20110302and20120402. - Twelve of eighteen sampled addresses returned names, nearly all matching their own address, as in
37-218-159-255.pppoe.ktnet.kg. - One does not:
89.237.223.255answers with213-145-223-255.pppoe.ktnet.kg.
Interesting
- That mismatch is the interesting thing in this record. Every other name encodes the address it belongs to, and this one encodes a different address entirely, in a range the operator does not announce here. The zone was generated once for space that has since been renumbered, and the stale records were carried across rather than regenerated. Anyone using reverse DNS to identify an address would be told the wrong network.
pppoenames the access protocol in every hostname, which dates the subscriber technology as clearly as any netname does. It is a dial-up-era protocol carried forward onto broadband lines, and operators keep it because the billing and authentication systems are built around it.- Seven dated netnames from 2005 to 2012, one every year or two, is a national operator growing steadily through the period when address space was still obtainable.
- Three neighbours carrying a country's internet. Landlocked markets depend on transit through their neighbours, and that constraint is visible directly in the neighbour count.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| KG-IX | Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan | 185.1.110.11 |
Transit providers
1 upstream, 2 downstream and 4 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS8449 | "ElCat" Ltd. | 2,108 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 15 prefixes · 82.94K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KG | Kyrgyzstan | 16 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS12997- Registry name
- KTNET
- Registrant
- KTNET-MNT
- Abuse contact
- azolotko@kt.kg
- Registered
- 2002-07-19
- Last changed
- 2025-12-19
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- Kyrgyztelecom
- Also known as
- KT
- Network type
- NSP
- Scope
- Regional
- Traffic ratio
- Mostly Inbound
- Peering policy
- Selective
- Present at
- 1 exchanges
- Website
- http://www.kt.kg
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 35 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 35 authorising AS12997
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 35 of 35 announcements
- Route objects
- 166 naming AS12997
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 432 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere