asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS12657 BAYCIX Benzstr. 13

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 24.58K 3 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 3 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly DE
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 1 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

BayCIX

Germany · AI-generated

isp business

Three /19s whose netnames use the two-digit and four-digit year forms six months apart.

What it's used for

  • Internet access in Bavaria. 24,576 addresses in three IPv4 prefixes, three IPv6 prefixes, and three observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • The netnames are DE-OK-990112, DE-OK-19990719 and DE-OK-20000510.
  • The first two are both from 1999, six months apart, and spell the year differently.
  • All three blocks are /19s: 212.72.64.0/19, 212.102.160.0/19 and 213.131.192.0/19.
  • The IPv6 announcements are 2001:1578::/48, 2001:1579::/47 and 2001:1579:2::/48.
  • Nine sampled addresses were queried and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • Netname dates come in a short form and a long form, and the usual assumption is that the long form replaced the short one when the year 2000 made two digits ambiguous. These two records disprove that inside a single organisation's own filings: January 1999 written as 990112 and July 1999 written as 19990719. Both conventions were available at once, and which one a block got depended on whoever filled in the form that day.
  • OK is not BayCIX. A netname family named for a company that no longer appears anywhere else in the record is the ordinary way address blocks carry their history, and the two 1999 dates say the predecessor was already collecting /19s before the year was out.
  • Three /19s and only three observed neighbours. The address holding is regional-carrier sized; the peering is not.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 1 downstream and 6 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS8767M-net Telekommunikations GmbH297
AS3209Vodafone GmbH9

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-18, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 3 prefixes · 24.58K addresses IPv6 3 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
DEGermany6

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS12657
Registry name
BAYCIX
Registrant
OK-NOC-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@baycix.net
Registered
2002-07-23
Last changed
2020-06-13
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 7 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
11 authorising AS12657
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 7 of 7 announcements
Route objects
11 naming AS12657

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 443 networks and 1,784 prefixes, as published 2026-10-19. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check