Autonomous system
AS10569 Red CENIAInternet
Unclassified
Summary
Red CENIAInternet (CENIAI)
isp government research legacy
Red CENIAInternet is the network of CENIAI (Centro Nacional de Intercambio Automatizado de Información) in Havana, the organisation that administered Cuba's first Internet connectivity and still holds the country's original address allocation.
What it's used for
The routing is unusually clean for a network this old: RIS observes exactly one IPv4 prefix carrying 65,536 addresses — 169.158.0.0/16, announced whole, with no deaggregation at all — plus a single IPv6 prefix, 2001:1340::/32. That /16 is Cuba's founding block, delegated to CENIAI in the mid-1990s, and it is still announced as one route thirty years later.
One observed BGP neighbour tells you this is not a carrier. CENIAI sits behind a single upstream and provides connectivity and hosting to Cuban institutions — scientific, academic, state and enterprise organisations — rather than selling transit onward. Cuba's mass-market and mobile subscribers ride ETECSA's networks, not this one, so the /16 is best read as institutional space: servers, mail, and organisational access rather than consumer eyeballs.
Notable
A country's entire early Internet presence in a single unsplit /16, behind a single peer, is a rare shape today. It reflects a network built when Cuba's connectivity was a single satellite-era link into a state research institution, and one that has never had commercial reasons to fragment.
Interesting
The block predates the RIR system's Latin American arm — it was assigned directly, before LACNIC existed, which is why a Cuban network sits in what looks like North American address space.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Address space
Summary
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CU | Cuba | 2 |
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
Threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere