asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS10569 Red CENIAInternet

Unclassified LACNIC

IPv4 addresses 65.54K 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly CU
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Red CENIAInternet (CENIAI)

Cuba · AI-generated

isp government research legacy

Red CENIAInternet is the network of CENIAI (Centro Nacional de Intercambio Automatizado de Información) in Havana, the organisation that administered Cuba's first Internet connectivity and still holds the country's original address allocation.

What it's used for

The routing is unusually clean for a network this old: RIS observes exactly one IPv4 prefix carrying 65,536 addresses — 169.158.0.0/16, announced whole, with no deaggregation at all — plus a single IPv6 prefix, 2001:1340::/32. That /16 is Cuba's founding block, delegated to CENIAI in the mid-1990s, and it is still announced as one route thirty years later.

One observed BGP neighbour tells you this is not a carrier. CENIAI sits behind a single upstream and provides connectivity and hosting to Cuban institutions — scientific, academic, state and enterprise organisations — rather than selling transit onward. Cuba's mass-market and mobile subscribers ride ETECSA's networks, not this one, so the /16 is best read as institutional space: servers, mail, and organisational access rather than consumer eyeballs.

Notable

A country's entire early Internet presence in a single unsplit /16, behind a single peer, is a rare shape today. It reflects a network built when Cuba's connectivity was a single satellite-era link into a state research institution, and one that has never had commercial reasons to fragment.

Interesting

The block predates the RIR system's Latin American arm — it was assigned directly, before LACNIC existed, which is why a Cuban network sits in what looks like North American address space.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS11960DE TELECOMUNICACIONES DE CUBA S.A. IXP CUBA91

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 65.54K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
CUCuba2

Registry

Allocation record

LACNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
LACNIC
Handle
AS10569
Registry name
10569
Registrant
Red CENIAInternet
Abuse contact
grimany@ceniai.inf.cu
Registered
1997-09-18
Last changed
2002-10-09
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 2 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS10569
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
Route objects
2 naming AS10569

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 445 networks and 1,817 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check