asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS10187 KISDI-AS-KR Korea Information Society Developement Institute

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 1.02K 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KR
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Korea Information Society Development Institute (KISDI)

South Korea · AI-generated

government research-institute public-sector south-korea

KISDI-AS-KR is held by the Korea Information Society Development Institute, the state ICT and broadcasting policy research institute. Founded in 1985, KISDI sits under the National Research Council for Economics, Humanities and Social Sciences and is funded from the national budget; it is the think tank behind much of Korea's telecoms and broadcasting regulation.

What it's used for

  • The institute's own campus and publishing infrastructure: researcher connectivity at its Jincheon site, its public research portal and statistical publications, and internal administrative systems.

Notable

  • The kind is government. The word Institute in a name proves nothing on its own — plenty of commercial firms use it — so the classification rests on what KISDI actually is: a government-funded research institute, not a university and not a company. It teaches no students and sells no product.
  • The routing is that of a single-site public body. RIS observes one announced prefix, 103.125.108.0/22 — 1,024 addresses — with 2 observed neighbours. One prefix announced whole, no deaggregation, two upstreams for redundancy. There is nothing here that resembles a provider, a hoster or an eyeball network; a thousand addresses behind two transit links is a few hundred staff and a modest server estate.

Interesting

  • The 103.x range is a late APNIC allocation, so despite holding an ASN from the 1990s, KISDI announces modern space rather than a big legacy Korean block. That usually means a renumbering, most likely when the institute moved out of Seoul.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS1237KISTI64
AS3786LG DACOM Corporation2

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-18, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 1.02K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KRKorea, Republic of1

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS10187
Registry name
KISDI-AS-KR-KR
Abuse contact
hostmaster@nic.or.kr
Registered
2000-09-01
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 1 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS10187
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
0% registered · 0 of 1 announcements
Route objects
7 naming AS10187

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 443 networks and 1,784 prefixes, as published 2026-10-19. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check