Autonomous system
AS10165 CUSTOMS-AS-KR KOREA CUSTOMS SERVICE
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
Korea Customs Service
government customs south-korea
CUSTOMS-AS-KR belongs to the Korea Customs Service (관세청), the national customs administration under the Ministry of Economy and Finance, responsible for clearing imports and exports at Korea's ports and airports and for collecting customs duties.
What it's used for
- The agency's internet-facing systems, above all the UNI-PASS electronic customs clearance platform that brokers, forwarders and traders use to file declarations, plus its public web presence.
Notable
This is a straightforward government network. The pack shows six announced IPv4 prefixes carrying 1,536 addresses and two observed BGP neighbours, with no IPv6.
Two things follow. First, the role: two upstreams and no peers is a dual-homed end site. It buys transit twice for resilience and announces nothing on anyone else's behalf, which excludes every provider kind — a customs service is a consumer of connectivity, not a seller of it, and the routing table agrees. Second, the shape of the space is telling: the six prefixes are six consecutive /24s, 211.173.40.0/24 through 211.173.45.0/24. That is a single contiguous 211.173.40.0/21-worth of address space deliberately deaggregated into individual /24s, the standard trick for steering inbound traffic across two upstreams. A network doing traffic engineering at that granularity over 1,536 addresses is running services that matter and must stay reachable.
Interesting
- Customs clearance is a hard dependency for import-heavy supply chains, so this small block quietly sits in front of a system a large share of Korean trade passes through.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-21, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 1.54K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 2 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS10165- Registry name
- CUSTOMS-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 2000-09-01
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 8 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS10165
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 75% registered · 6 of 8 announcements
- Route objects
- 9 naming AS10165
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-22. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere