asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS10162 SNUH-AS-KR SNUH

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 5.12K 4 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KR
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 3 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Seoul National University Hospital (SNUH)

South Korea · AI-generated

business healthcare hospital south-korea

SNUH-AS-KR is the network of Seoul National University Hospital, the academic medical centre in Jongno-gu, Seoul. Since 1978 it has been a special corporation established by its own act of law, legally separate from Seoul National University and supervised in part by the education ministry.

What it's used for

  • Hospital IT: clinical and electronic-medical-record systems, imaging, the appointment and patient portals, and links out to the hospital's satellite campuses and research institutes.

Notable

Classified business in the enterprise sense — a large institution running its own network for its own operations. It is not education, despite the university in the name: SNUH is a separate corporate body from the campus, and the network carries a hospital rather than a student population. It is not government either, even though the state supervises it, because it is a self-standing corporation delivering a service.

The pack settles the role. Four announced IPv4 prefixes hold 5,120 addresses, led by a 203.229.128.0/20 aggregate, with no IPv6 and three observed BGP neighbours. Three upstreams is a multi-homed end site buying resilience — the right posture for an organisation where an outage is a clinical-safety problem, not a customer-service one. A provider of any kind would show peers in the tens or hundreds against this much space; a hospital shows three.

Interesting

  • One clean /20 plus three stray /23–/24s is a typical Korean institutional pattern: an early aggregate, then small top-ups from different providers as new buildings and affiliated centres came online.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

3 upstream, 0 downstream and 3 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS9318SK Broadband Co Ltd142
AS1237KISTI68
AS3786LG DACOM Corporation38

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-15, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 4 prefixes · 5.12K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KRKorea, Republic of4

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS10162
Registry name
SNUH-AS-KR-KR
Abuse contact
hostmaster@nic.or.kr
Registered
2000-09-01
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 4 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS10162
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 4 of 4 announcements
Route objects
6 naming AS10162

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,781 prefixes, as published 2026-10-16. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check