asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS10161 QIA-AS-KR QIA

Unclassified ARIN

IPv4 addresses 256 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KR
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

QIA

South Korea · AI-generated

government south-korea unconfirmed-holder

QIA-AS-KR is a small South Korean autonomous system registered simply as QIA. The strongest reading of that abbreviation in a Korean context is the Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency (검역본부), the national quarantine and inspection body under the agriculture ministry, which uses the qia.go.kr domain.

What it's used for

  • On the balance of evidence, a single public-sector office network: the agency's own web presence and administrative systems, single-sited and NATed behind a small public block.

Notable

The identification is deliberately hedged, because a three-letter handle is evidence in neither direction and the registry gives no expanded legal name here. What the pack does settle is the role. There is exactly one announced IPv4 prefix, 211.241.91.0/24 — 256 addresses — and two observed BGP neighbours, with no IPv6. That is a dual-homed end site: it takes transit from two upstreams for resilience and announces one legacy /24 back. Nothing about it can be an access network (there is no space to hand out), a hosting provider (a /24 is not a product) or a carrier (two adjacencies is not a peering estate). Whoever the holder turns out to be, this AS exists so one organisation's public services keep a stable address block across two providers.

The .go.kr association behind the QIA abbreviation is what tips it to government rather than business, and it is recorded here at low confidence precisely because the routing evidence alone cannot distinguish the two.

Interesting

  • The quarantine agency in its current form dates from a 2011 merger, so the AS and its /24 almost certainly predate the name now attached to them.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS3786LG DACOM Corporation34
AS45400Korea Telecom29

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-23, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KRKorea, Republic of1

Registry

Allocation record

ARIN · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
ARIN
Handle
AS10161
Registry name
QIA-AS-KR-KR
Abuse contact
hostmaster@nic.or.kr
Registered
2000-09-01
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 1 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS10161
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
Route objects
4 naming AS10161

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-24. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check