Autonomous system
AS10111 ZEONET-AS-AP Zeofast Network
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
Zeofast Network
ZEONET-AS-AP is Zeofast Network, a small Asia-Pacific network operator that describes itself as a network service provider offering "solutions for global connectivity" and lists Dalian, China. It is a legible operator with an odd address footprint, and the two facts have to be held together.
What it's used for
Interconnection, and probably transit and hosting for other people's traffic. The AS announces 19 IPv4 prefixes totalling only 4,864 addresses plus 15 IPv6 prefixes, and is seen with 55 observed BGP neighbours. That ratio is the interesting part: fifty-plus neighbours against fewer than five thousand addresses means this network's product is connectivity, not an address estate. It carries traffic for others rather than serving a subscriber base of its own. Its self-reported peering profile matches — open policy, ports at exchanges in Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore and San Francisco.
Notable
Held deliberately at low confidence. Every announced IPv4 block is a single /24, and they are drawn from all three major registries at once — RIPE space (212.100.186.0/24, 62.72.181.0/24, 77.107.118.0/24), ARIN-region space (38.111.221.0/24, 104.192.94.0/24, 128.254.240.0/24) and APNIC space (103.x, 45.x, 222.167.244.0/24). A patchwork of unconnected /24s assembled across registries is the classic silhouette of leased or brokered address space rather than an operator's own allocations.
Interesting
Do not geolocate these prefixes to the holder's stated city. Each /24 needs to be checked against its own registration; where the space is leased, the addresses are used wherever the lessee's traffic lands, which for a network peering in Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore may be anywhere in the region.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 6 exchanges in 4 countries, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Equinix Internet Exchange Singapore | Singapore, Singapore | 27.111.230.245 |
| BroadBand Internet eXchange Tokyo | Tokyo, Japan | 101.203.90.177 |
| JPIX Tokyo | Tokyo, Japan | 210.171.225.228 |
| Equinix Internet Exchange Hong Kong | Hong Kong, China | 2001:de8:7::1:111:1 |
| Equinix Internet Exchange Tokyo | Tokyo, Japan | 2001:de8:5::1:111:1 |
| San Francisco Metropolitan Internet Exchange | San Francisco, United States | 206.197.187.86 |
Transit providers
18 upstream, 12 downstream and 43 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 18 prefixes · 5.38K addresses IPv6 16 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CN | China | 34 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS10111- Registry name
- ZEONET-AS-AP
- Registrant
- Zeofast Network
- Abuse contact
- abuse@zeofast.net
- Registered
- 2020-03-31
- Last changed
- 2024-06-12
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 80% valid · 28 valid, 7 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 38 authorising AS10111
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 97% registered · 34 of 35 announcements 1 other origin
- Route objects
- 2,217 naming AS10111
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,772 prefixes, as published 2026-10-15. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere