Autonomous system
AS10103 HKBN-AS-AP HK Broadband Network Ltd.
Residential APNIC
Summary
HK Broadband Network Ltd
HKBN-AS-AP is Hong Kong Broadband Network, one of Hong Kong's largest residential fibre ISPs. AS10103 is a second, sizeable HKBN origin alongside the better-known AS9269, and it carries a large slice of the same access estate.
What it's used for
Consumer and small-business broadband in Hong Kong. The AS announces 266 IPv4 prefixes totalling 190,976 addresses plus 7 IPv6 prefixes, including several /18s and /19s (14.198.64.0/18, 203.176.224.0/19, 123.1.160.0/19). Every sampled PTR sits under ctinets.com, HKBN's own legacy service domain inherited from City Telecom, the company that founded it. The naming is machine-generated per address — 014198064005.ctinets.com, 123001160005.ctinets.com — which is what an access ISP does when it has to name a hundred thousand subscriber lines. A subset carries an extra .static. label (202077032005.static.ctinets.com), marking the fixed assignments HKBN sells to business customers out of the same pool.
Notable
This is an eyeball network. Nearly 191,000 addresses against only 90 observed BGP neighbours is the access-ISP silhouette: a wholesale carrier holding that much space would peer with hundreds or thousands of ASes, while an eyeball ISP takes a few upstreams and peers locally, in HKBN's case largely at HKIX. Geolocate this space to Hong Kong households and SME premises, not to a datacentre.
Interesting
The ctinets.com zone is a fossil of City Telecom (HK), the parent that spun HKBN out. The company was renamed and sold, but the reverse-DNS domain was never migrated, so the old name still answers for a very large chunk of Hong Kong's consumer internet.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Hong Kong Internet Exchange | Hong Kong, China | 123.255.90.100 |
Transit providers
7 upstream, 81 downstream and 106 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS9269 | Hong Kong Broadband Network Ltd. | 15,489 |
| AS4635 | Hong Kong Internet Exchange--Route Server 1 | 267 |
| AS24482 | SG.GS | 162 |
| AS6453 | TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC | 61 |
| AS23764 | CTGNet | 4 |
| AS9930 | TIME dotCom Berhad No. 14, Jalan Majistret U1/26 Hicom Glenmarie Industrial Park 40150 Shah Alam Selangor, Malaysia | 2 |
| AS8359 | MTS PJSC | 1 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 206 prefixes · 179K addresses IPv6 5 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| HK | Hong Kong | 211 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS10103- Registry name
- HKBN-AS-AP
- Registrant
- Hong Kong Broadband Network Limited
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@hkbn.com.hk
- Registered
- 2008-09-04
- Last changed
- 2020-07-15
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 281 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 82 authorising AS10103
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 99.6% registered · 280 of 281 announcements
- Route objects
- 18,328 naming AS10103
Reputation
Classification and threat
Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 436 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere