Autonomous system
AS10061 FSS-AS Financial Supervisory Service
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
Financial Supervisory Service (FSS)
FSS-AS-KR is the Financial Supervisory Service, South Korea's integrated financial regulator. It examines and supervises banks, insurers, securities firms and other financial institutions on behalf of the Financial Services Commission. AS10061 is its own, very small, network.
What it's used for
The internet edge of a supervisory body: the public website, the consumer-complaint and financial-education portals, and — most importantly — the electronic filing and reporting channels through which supervised institutions submit data to the regulator. The AS announces 2 IPv4 prefixes totalling 256 addresses and no IPv6, and the pair is unusual enough to be worth reading closely: 61.73.100.0/25 and 61.73.100.128/25. Those are the two halves of a single /24, announced separately. Splitting a /24 into two /25s and originating each is a classic multihoming trick — it lets an operator steer inbound traffic across two upstreams while still owning only one /24 of address space.
Notable
A government network. It is one of the smallest routed footprints in this range, and it should be: a regulator has no subscribers, no hosting business and no reason to hold more than a handful of public addresses. 256 addresses against two observed BGP neighbours is an end-site that multihomes for availability, nothing more. A carrier would show hundreds of adjacencies.
Interesting
Strictly, the FSS is a special-purpose public corporation rather than a ministry, funded largely by levies on the institutions it supervises. It is nonetheless the state's financial supervisor in practice, which is why this is carded as government rather than business.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-22, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS10061- Registry name
- FSS-AS-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 2000-06-16
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 4 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS10061
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 50% registered · 2 of 4 announcements
- Route objects
- 2 naming AS10061
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-23. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere