Autonomous system
AS10043 MIC-AS-KR Ministry of Science and ICT
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
Ministry of Science and ICT (Korea)
government ministry korea
MIC-AS-KR is registered to the Republic of Korea's Ministry of Science and ICT — the central-government department responsible for research and development policy, telecoms and broadcasting regulation, spectrum, and the country's digital-government and AI strategy. The MIC handle preserves an earlier incarnation, the Ministry of Information and Communication, which was folded into successor ministries in later reorganisations.
What it's used for
- The ministry's own connectivity: internal departmental systems and the public-facing services it operates directly, alongside links into Korea's government network infrastructure.
Notable
- Government, plainly, and the routing is that of a small end site rather than of a national backbone. RIS observes 2 IPv4 prefixes carrying 512 addresses —
58.184.108.0/24and210.95.88.0/24— behind 2 observed neighbours. Two /24s, dual-homed, announcing nothing for anyone else. - The scale is worth dwelling on, because it is easy to over-read a ministry. A department that sets national ICT policy does not need a large public address footprint: Korea's agencies sit behind a consolidated government network, and the ministry's own AS carries the slice it administers directly. The number here reflects an administrative boundary, not the ministry's importance or its reach.
- The two /24s come from unrelated ranges, consistent with space assigned in different eras and simply retained.
Interesting
- Ministries reorganise more often than routing registries do. A stale handle such as
MICis a genuine historical marker — but it names the department that was, not the one that holds the number today.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-18, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 512 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 2 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS10043- Registry name
- MIC-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 2000-06-16
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 2 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS10043
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
- Route objects
- 5 naming AS10043
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 443 networks and 1,784 prefixes, as published 2026-10-19. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere