Autonomous system
AS9950 PUBNETPLUS2-AS-KR DACOM-PUBNETPLUS
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
LG U+ PUBNETPLUS (ex-DACOM)
government isp business legacy
AS9950 (PUBNETPLUS2-AS-KR) is registered as DACOM-PUBNETPLUS. PUBNETPLUS is the Korean national information-and-communications service that LG U+ operates for government agencies, public institutions and schools; DACOM was the fixed-line carrier that ran it before being absorbed into LG U+ in the 2010 merger of LG Telecom, Dacom and Powercom. The service still carries the Dacom name in the registry and the PUBNETPLUS name in LG U+'s own public-sector product line.
What it's used for
This is a public-sector access network rather than a consumer ISP. RIS sees 24 IPv4 prefixes carrying 66,560 addresses and no IPv6. The structure is a single large aggregate, 58.184.0.0/16, plus about twenty /24 deaggregates carved out of that same /16 and announced alongside it, with a couple of strays from 211.40.x, 211.42.x and 61.108.x. Announcing both the covering /16 and its more-specifics is deliberate traffic engineering — it lets individual government or institutional sites be steered independently while the aggregate still covers everything.
Five observed neighbours places it squarely as a downstream access network. It reaches the internet through a small number of upstreams inside the LG U+ estate and terminates that connectivity at public-sector customers; it is not selling transit to anybody.
Notable
- The
PUBNETPLUS2in the handle marks it as the second of the PUBNETPLUS ASNs — AS9316 also carries the DACOM-PUBNETPLUS name. Describe the network in front of you, not the group: this is one slice of a larger public-sector service. - Address space registered to a carrier but used by government and educational bodies is why geolocation and threat-intel feeds often mislabel this range as generic Korean broadband.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 4 downstream and 5 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS17841 | NATIONAL INFORMATION RESOURCES SERVICE | 1,518 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 55 prefixes · 63.23K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 55 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS9950- Registry name
- PUBNETPLUS2-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 2000-04-14
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 237 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9950
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 90% registered · 214 of 237 announcements
- Route objects
- 133 naming AS9950
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 440 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere