asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9999 ATTOKYO AT TOKYO Corporation

Hosting RIPE

IPv4 addresses 20.22K 10 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly JP
Exchanges 4 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 1 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

AT TOKYO Corporation

Japan · AI-generated

hosting enterprise legacy

AS9999 (ATTOKYO) is held by AT TOKYO Corporation, a Japanese data-centre and colocation operator headquartered in Toyosu, Koto-ku, Tokyo. It is a facilities business first and a network operator second: the ASN exists to give colocation tenants routed address space and interconnection out of AT TOKYO's own halls, not to sell transit or serve consumers.

What it's used for

The routing footprint is small and stable rather than sprawling: 10 IPv4 prefixes carrying 20,224 addresses, plus a single IPv6 /32 (2405:1800::/32), announced with only 2 observed BGP neighbours. That combination is the signature of a customer-facing colocation network rather than a carrier. A wholesale or transit AS of any size peers with hundreds of others; an eyeball ISP holding twenty thousand addresses would still have a broad upstream mix. Two neighbours and a compact block list instead describe an AS whose job is to originate a handful of allocations on behalf of the businesses racked inside its facilities. The sampled reverse DNS points the same way: the PTRs that resolve belong to corporate customers rather than to residential subscribers or to AT TOKYO itself. The prefixes are AT TOKYO's own APNIC allocations, registered under the ATTOKYO netname and marked ALLOCATED PORTABLE, so this is not resold or brokered space.

Notable

  • AT TOKYO operates carrier-neutral data centres in Japan, with its largest campus in the Tokyo bay-front area; the facilities, not the ASN, are the product.
  • The ASN is sometimes tagged as a Cable/DSL/ISP network in third-party directories. The inventory does not support that reading: there is no eyeball-style reverse DNS and no broad peering fan-out.
  • Address space is drawn entirely from APNIC and registered to the company itself, which rules out the multi-RIR, third-party-registrant pattern typical of IP leasing.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 4 exchanges in 2 countries, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
DE-CIX FrankfurtFrankfurt, Germany80.81.196.75
BroadBand Internet eXchange TokyoTokyo, Japan101.203.88.186
JPIX TokyoTokyo, Japan210.171.224.146
Network Service Provider IXP (Distributed IX in Edo)Tokyo, Japan202.249.2.175

Transit providers

1 upstream, 1 downstream and 4 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS2497Internet Initiative Japan Inc.623

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-19, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 10 prefixes · 20.22K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
JPJapan11

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS9999
Registry name
ATTOKYO
Registered
2000-04-27
Last changed
2014-06-18
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
73% valid · 8 valid, 3 with no ROA
ROAs
8 authorising AS9999
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 11 of 11 announcements
Route objects
11 naming AS9999

Reputation

Classification and threat

Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,778 prefixes, as published 2026-10-20. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check