Autonomous system
AS9988 MPT-AP Myanma Posts and Telecommunications
Unclassified APNIC Cable/DSL/ISP
Summary
Myanma Posts and Telecommunications (MPT)
legacy isp mobile government
AS9988 (MPT-AP) is held by Myanma Posts and Telecommunications, the state-owned incumbent operator of Myanmar, supervised by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. MPT was the country's only telecommunications operator until the market opened in 2013, and it still runs both fixed-line services and a nationwide mobile network. Since 2014 it has operated under a joint-operations agreement with KDDI Summit Global Myanmar, the KDDI/Sumitomo vehicle, though that agreement's scope was narrowed in 2025.
What it's used for
Subscriber access for a national incumbent. RIS observes 61 IPv4 prefixes carrying 24,064 addresses, one IPv6 aggregate (2401:f200::/32), and one BGP neighbour. Two things fall out of that. First, twenty-four thousand public IPv4 addresses is a startlingly small pool for the incumbent of a country of over fifty million, which means subscribers sit behind carrier-grade NAT at scale, the normal posture for a mobile-first market that built out after IPv4 exhaustion. The /32 of IPv6 is a full ISP-sized allocation and is the real growth path. Second, a single observed neighbour means this AS is not a transit seller: it announces its own eyeball space upward through its international gateway and nothing more.
The IPv4 side is built on large blocks (203.81.64.0/19, 45.41.112.0/20, 136.228.160.0/20) deaggregated into /21s and /22s covering the same ranges, a traffic-engineering habit typical of an operator balancing several international links. The 203.81.64.0/19 is the historical MPT allocation; the 45.41 and 136.228 space is what an operator picks up as it grows.
Notable
- MPT is the incumbent and remains state-owned, so this AS is simultaneously a commercial eyeball network and a government-held asset.
- The v4-per-subscriber ratio implies heavy CGNAT; treat per-address geolocation and abuse attribution here as unusually coarse.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS45558 | MYANMA POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS | 3,543 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-29, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 25 prefixes · 23.81K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| MM | Myanmar | 26 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9988- Registry name
- MPT-AP
- Registrant
- Myanma Post & Telecommunication
- Abuse contact
- abuse@mptmmf.net
- Registered
- 2008-09-04
- Last changed
- 2020-08-19
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- Myanma Posts and Telecommunications (MPT)
- Also known as
- MPT
- Network type
- Cable/DSL/ISP
- Scope
- Asia Pacific
- Peering policy
- Open
- Website
- http://www.mpt.com.mm
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 95% valid · 61 valid, 2 with no ROA 1 RPKI-invalid
- ROAs
- 20 authorising AS9988
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 64 of 64 announcements
- Route objects
- 224 naming AS9988
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 448 networks and 1,849 prefixes, as published 2026-10-29. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere