Autonomous system
AS9973 BSITC-AS-KR BSITC
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
BSITC
legacy
AS9973 (BSITC-AS-KR) is registered to BSITC, a small company in Bupyeong-gu, Incheon. Korean business records describe it as a telecommunications reseller rather than a facilities-based carrier, and it has no public network presence of the kind an ISP or hosting brand would maintain. This card describes what the routing shows, because the operator's role cannot be pinned down from the evidence with confidence.
What it's used for
RIS sees 11 announced IPv4 prefixes totalling 7,680 addresses, no IPv6, and only 1 observed BGP neighbour.
The inventory is the interesting part. Six /22s carry most of the space, and they come from six unrelated legacy Korean ranges — 203.227, 203.235, 203.231, 203.236, 103.106 and 61.252 — with a /23 and four /24s in 203.238 and 202.124 making up the rest. Nothing is contiguous. A network that grew organically usually has at least one aggregate it grew around; this one is a collection of separately-sourced blocks of near-identical size, held by a company with a small footprint and a single upstream.
That pattern is consistent with several very different stories — a reseller numbering business customers, a small hoster, or space held and sublet on behalf of others — and the evidence here does not distinguish between them. The single BGP neighbour at least rules out any transit or peering role: whatever the space carries, it sits behind one provider.
Notable
- Treat per-address attribution in this ASN with care. The holder is not obviously the user of the space, and the block-by-block sourcing suggests different prefixes may serve different end organisations.
- The address inventory is entirely within one registry's ranges (APNIC/KRNIC), which argues against the classic multi-RIR address-broker profile even though the dispersion is unusual.
- No IPv6 is announced.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS9848 | SEJONG NETWORKS | 671 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-27, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 9 prefixes · 7.68K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 9 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS9973- Registry name
- BSITC-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 2000-04-14
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 11 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9973
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 11 of 11 announcements
- Route objects
- 30 naming AS9973
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 447 networks and 1,852 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere