Autonomous system
AS9952 HOSTWAY-AS-KR Hostway IDC
Hosting APNIC
Summary
Hostway IDC Korea
hosting legacy
AS9952 (HOSTWAY-AS-KR) is held by Hostway Korea, a hosting and internet data-centre operator running a carrier-neutral facility in Bundang, Seongnam. It sells colocation, dedicated servers, shared and cloud hosting — a classic web-hosting IDC business rather than an access provider.
What it's used for
Everything about the routing says shared hosting at scale. RIS sees 174 IPv4 prefixes carrying 47,616 addresses and no IPv6. That is a high prefix count against a modest address total, and the individual prefixes are small — mostly /20s down to /23s — drawn from a wide spread of unrelated Korean ranges: 61.100.x, 61.109.x, 61.250.x, 203.248.x, 210.109.x, 211.43.x, 211.115.x, 211.239.x, plus 103.24.8.0/22 and even a US-registered 66.232.136.0/22. Hosting companies accumulate exactly this kind of patchwork, because they buy address space wherever they can get it as customer demand grows, rather than receiving one clean allocation.
The reverse DNS confirms the tenancy model: sampled addresses resolve to individual customer domain names — shot-online.com, drclio.co.kr — rather than to any infrastructure naming scheme of Hostway's own. Servers named after the sites they host is what a shared/dedicated hosting estate looks like from the outside. Only 3 observed neighbours, so upstream connectivity comes from a small number of Korean carriers into the carrier-neutral facility.
Notable
- The
66.232.136.0/22announcement is ARIN-region space announced from a Korean AS — unusual, but consistent with a hosting operator that has held legacy address blocks across registries. - The
61.100.0.0range also appears under AS9947 (kt cloud), showing how that legacy Korean block was divided among hosting and IDC operators. - Hosting ASNs like this one show up disproportionately in abuse and reputation feeds, simply because thousands of unrelated customer sites share the address space.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Korea Internet Neutral Exchange KINX | Seoul, South Korea | 139.150.100.57 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 82 prefixes · 47.61K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 82 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9952- Registry name
- HOSTWAY-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 2000-04-14
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 174 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9952
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 174 of 174 announcements
- Route objects
- 185 naming AS9952
Reputation
Classification and threat
Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere