Autonomous system
AS9935 AGNSCUS-HK AGNS Customer AS
Hosting APNIC
Summary
AT&T Global Network Services — AGNS Customer AS
enterprise business legacy
AS9935 (AGNSCUS-HK) is an AT&T Global Network Services customer AS. AGNS is AT&T's managed global enterprise networking arm — the business that runs corporate VPNs, managed WAN and dedicated internet access for multinationals — and this ASN is one of the numbers it uses to originate routes on behalf of customers in its Hong Kong / Asia-Pacific footprint.
What it's used for
The routing evidence is about as small as an AS gets: RIS sees exactly one IPv4 prefix, 193.149.194.0/24 (256 addresses), no IPv6, and one observed neighbour. A single upstream and a single /24 is the classic shape of an AS that exists purely so a route can be originated with distinct origin attribution, not because the operator needs an independent routing policy.
The prefix itself is the confirming detail. 193.149.194.0/24 sits inside a RIPE allocation registered to ORG-AGNS1-RIPE — AT&T Global Network Services' own RIPE organisation object — even though the ASN itself is registered through APNIC with an AT&T Asia-Pacific contact. European-registered AT&T address space, announced by a Hong Kong-handled AT&T ASN, is exactly what a global managed-network provider's estate looks like: the address inventory and the routing entity are administered in different regions of the same company.
Notable
- The
-CUS-in the handle iscustomer, not a company name. Shared "customer AS" numbers are a long-standing AGNS practice for enterprise sites that need BGP but not their own ASN. - Registered under APNIC with AT&T Asia-Pacific contacts while announcing RIPE-registered AT&T space — a cross-RIR arrangement that looks odd but is internally consistent within one company.
- Not an eyeball or hosting network. Nothing here serves the public internet; it is enterprise connectivity plumbing.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS2686 | AT&T Enterprises, LLC | 60 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| JP | Japan | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9935- Registry name
- AGNSCUS-HK
- Registrant
- AT&T Japan K.K.
- Abuse contact
- peering@intl.att.com
- Registered
- 2009-11-10
- Last changed
- 2020-07-07
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 1 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9935
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
- Route objects
- 1 naming AS9935
Reputation
Classification and threat
Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-15. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere