asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9919 NCIC-TW New Century InfoComm Tech Co., Ltd.

Residential DROP-listed space APNIC

IPv4 addresses 505K 736 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 73 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly TW
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 1 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

New Century InfoComm Tech (Sparq / SEEDNet)

Taiwan · AI-generated

isp residential legacy

AS9919 (NCIC-TW) is held by New Century InfoComm Tech Co., Ltd. (新世紀資通), a Taiwanese fixed-line telecom operator. NCIC was set up by the Far Eastern Group and took a fixed-network licence in 2001; it trades under the Sparq (速博) and SEEDNet brands, and Far EasTone Telecommunications acquired it outright in 2010. It remains one of Taiwan's significant non-Chunghwa fixed-line and broadband providers.

What it's used for

This is the eyeball network. RIS sees 853 IPv4 prefixes carrying roughly 700,000 addresses, 16 IPv6 prefixes including a large 2401:8000::/27, and only 3 observed BGP neighbours. That last number is the one that settles the role. Seven hundred thousand addresses is a national-scale access pool, but a wholesale carrier holding that much space would peer with hundreds of networks; three neighbours means AS9919 exists to carry NCIC's own subscribers, with its parent group handling the transit and peering relationships.

Reverse DNS is uniform, self-owned and unambiguous, all under sparqnet.net. The templates split neatly into two populations: dynamic access lines named adsl-218-211-0-5.sparqnet.net, and statically assigned addresses named 122-146-0-5.static.sparqnet.net. Regional labels appear in the middle of the names (nh, tc, ll, n1), so the naming encodes the access region as well as the line type. That is exactly the naming discipline of a broadband ISP, not a hosting or transit network.

Notable

  • The v4 space is heavily deaggregated: the same blocks are announced as /15s, /16s and /17s simultaneously, a common traffic-engineering habit at large access ISPs.
  • SEEDNet, one of Taiwan's oldest ISP brands, was merged into NCIC in 2009 and the brand was kept.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 1 downstream and 4 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS4780Digital United Inc.49,208
AS19551Incapsula Inc118

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 736 prefixes · 505K addresses IPv6 73 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
TWTaiwan, Province of China809

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS9919
Registry name
NCIC-TW
Abuse contact
antispam@seed.net.tw
Registered
2008-09-04
Last changed
2025-11-06
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
99.9% valid · 860 valid, 1 with no ROA
ROAs
149 authorising AS9919
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
99.7% registered · 858 of 861 announcements 3 other origin
Route objects
7,113 naming AS9919

Reputation

Classification and threat

Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

2 DROP matches Announced space overlapping the DROP prefix list.

AnnouncedDROP entryRecord
103.193.184.0/22103.193.184.0/22SBL650046
107.155.224.0/22107.155.224.0/22SBL616009

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 432 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

2 IC3 indicators addresses in this network appear in FBI IC3 cybersecurity advisories.

PrefixAdvisoryPublished
123.51.223.96Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data2026-10-08
123.51.237.194Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data2026-10-08

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check