Autonomous system
AS9918 KGTNET-TW KG Telecommunication Co., Ltd
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
Tai Fu International Network (ex KG Telecom)
enterprise legacy
AS9918's registry entry today reads TAI FU INTERNATIONAL NETWORK CO., LTD. under the handle TAIFU-AS, registered in Taiwan. Older records and several databases still show the ASN under its original Taiwanese handle KGTNET-TW for KG Telecommunication. The company now holding it has no meaningful public footprint, so this card describes what the routing shows rather than asserting a corporate story that cannot be checked.
What it's used for
The inventory looks like Hong Kong corporate connectivity. RIS sees 18 IPv4 prefixes carrying 4,352 addresses and 3 IPv6 prefixes, with only 3 observed BGP neighbours — far too few peers to be any kind of carrier. The v4 space is not one allocation: it is scattered /24s drawn from six unrelated parents (152.101, 202.66, 202.76, 202.80, 202.88, 202.133), and the three v6 prefixes come from two different parent blocks.
Reverse DNS is where it gets interesting. Most sampled addresses answer under static.hk.net, a domain belonging to HKNet, a long-established Hong Kong ISP now part of NTT Com Asia — a different company from the registered holder. The rest are named for Hong Kong corporate end-users: a media firm, a trading company, an electronics manufacturer. Read carefully, that means the space carries Hong Kong business customers on statically assigned addresses, using another operator's naming convention. It does not make AS9918 that operator.
Notable
- Registered in Taiwan, but everything the network carries points at Hong Kong.
- Scattered
/24s from many unrelated parents plus third-party reverse DNS is a shape worth treating with caution; the holder's identity is not independently confirmable.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 13 prefixes · 4.35K addresses IPv6 3 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| TW | Taiwan, Province of China | 16 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Registered
- 2000-03-28
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 86% valid · 18 valid, 3 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 20 authorising AS9918
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 21 of 21 announcements
- Route objects
- 2,196 naming AS9918
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere