asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9891 CSLOX-IDC-AS-AP CS LOXINFO Public Company Limited.

Hosting APNIC

IPv4 addresses 48.64K 94 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 11 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly TH
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 4 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

CS LoxInfo (IDC)

Thailand · AI-generated

hosting isp legacy

AS9891 (CSLOX-IDC-AS-AP) is held by CS LoxInfo Public Company Limited (CSL), a Bangkok-based ICT provider founded in 1994 and part of the AIS group since 2018. As the handle says, this is CSL's Internet Data Center AS — the network behind its hosting, colocation and cloud business, rather than its consumer access network.

What it's used for

The routing evidence is unusually self-consistent. RIS sees 102 IPv4 prefixes carrying 51,712 addresses, 7 IPv6 prefixes, and 7 observed BGP neighbours. Fifty thousand addresses with only seven neighbours is not a carrier — a wholesale transit business of that address size would peer with hundreds of networks. It is a hosting estate: a large pool of addresses handed out to servers, reached through a small number of upstreams. The reverse DNS confirms it directly. Sampled addresses resolve as idc-27-254-60-5.csloxinfo.com and reverse-203-172-40-5.csloxinfo.net — the operator's own generated hosting PTRs — mixed with customer-configured names on individual servers (ns1.pimjob.com, linux.psquare.co.th). Machine-generated idc- PTRs alongside bespoke customer hostnames is what a shared data centre looks like from the outside.

Notable

  • The bulk of the space is drawn from 27.254.0.0/16, announced as dozens of /21s and /22s — the classic pattern of a hosting provider slicing one large allocation into per-rack or per-product blocks.
  • CSL operates data centres in several Thai regions, so addresses in this AS are not necessarily in Bangkok even though the company is headquartered there.
  • IPv6 is deployed across several ranges including 2404:b1::/32 and 2400:b5c0::/32.
  • This is the IDC network specifically; CSL's other business lines sit behind different ASNs, so do not read consumer broadband into addresses seen here.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 4 downstream and 10 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS7568CS LOXINFO Public Company Limited.6,521
AS45265CSLOXINFO Transit AS with Domestic (National Internet Exchange)114

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 94 prefixes · 48.64K addresses IPv6 11 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
THThailand105

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS9891
Registry name
CSLOX-IDC-AS-AP
Registrant
CS Loxinfo Public Company Limited
Abuse contact
csl-ip-admin@ais.co.th
Registered
2008-09-04
Last changed
2020-07-07
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
91% valid · 104 valid, 8 with no ROA 2 RPKI-invalid
ROAs
110 authorising AS9891
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
99.1% registered · 113 of 114 announcements
Route objects
204 naming AS9891

Reputation

Classification and threat

Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check