Autonomous system
AS9870 DEUNET-AS DONG-EUI UNIVERSITY
Education ARIN
Summary
Dong-Eui University
education university research legacy
AS9870 (DEUNET-AS-KR) is held by Dong-Eui University (동의대학교), a large private university in Busan. Opened in 1979 and granted university status in 1983, it enrolls roughly twenty-three thousand students across ten colleges and several graduate schools, and is particularly known for its engineering and Korean-medicine faculties.
What it's used for
This is the biggest network in its immediate ASN neighbourhood, and it is unambiguously a campus. RIS observes 50 IPv4 prefixes totalling 23,040 addresses, no IPv6, and one BGP neighbour. The single upstream is the whole story on role: with one neighbour there is no peering, no transit, and nothing sold onward. Twenty-three thousand public addresses behind one provider is a network that consumes connectivity for its own users.
The announcement is heavily deaggregated. A 113.198.224.0/19 is present alongside its own /20 halves, and the same nesting recurs with 203.241.192.0/20 against 203.241.192.0/21 and 203.241.200.0/21, and again across the 114.70.180.0 and 210.107.240.0 ranges. Announcing a covering aggregate and its components simultaneously is a deliberate pattern, usually so that specific sub-blocks can be steered or protected independently while the aggregate keeps the route alive. Fifty prefixes for thirteen distinct-looking ranges is the result.
The address count roughly matches the student head count, which is what an older Korean campus looks like when residences, teaching labs, staff offices and departmental servers all sit on public IPv4 rather than behind NAT.
Notable
- Announces both aggregates and their constituent sub-prefixes, which inflates the prefix count well beyond the number of underlying allocations.
- Single-homed, IPv4 only, with no IPv6 in the routing table despite the size of the network.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS4766 | Korea Telecom | 2,987 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 19 prefixes · 23.04K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 19 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS9870- Registry name
- DEUNET-AS-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 2000-02-04
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 55 with no ROA 1 RPKI-invalid
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9870
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 98% registered · 55 of 56 announcements 1 other origin
- Route objects
- 29 naming AS9870
Reputation
Classification and threat
Education University, school or national research and education network.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 440 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere