asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9844 HANINTERNET-AS-KR - Duruan

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 512 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KR
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Duruan (HANINTERNET-AS)

South Korea · AI-generated

legacy

AS9844 (HANINTERNET-AS) is registered to Duruan, a South Korean organisation. Beyond the registry record, public information about this holder is thin: the name does not map to a company with a visible web presence, and the registry handle (HANINTERNET) and the holder name (Duruan) do not obviously belong to the same brand. This card therefore sticks to what the routing evidence actually shows.

What it's used for

The network is about as small as a routed AS gets. RIS sees a single IPv4 prefix, 118.91.146.0/23 (512 addresses), no IPv6, and exactly one BGP neighbour. One prefix behind one upstream means this AS is single-homed: it is not multihoming for resilience, it is not peering with anyone, and it has no downstream customer cone. Whatever the AS number was originally obtained for, the network it describes today is a single small block of Korean address space reached through one provider.

A shape like this is usually one of two things: a small hosting or service business that keeps its own AS so it can move providers without renumbering, or a legacy registration that has outlived the network it was created for. The evidence available does not let us choose between those, so no functional claim is made here.

Notable

  • The handle contains HANINTERNET, but a handle is not evidence of the operator's identity or line of business, and it should not be read as one.
  • With one prefix and one neighbour, this AS is single-homed, which is unusual for a network that bothered to obtain an ASN.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS38661abcle59

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-05, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 512 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KRKorea, Republic of1

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS9844
Registry name
HANINTERNET-AS-KR
Abuse contact
hostmaster@nic.or.kr
Registered
2000-02-04
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 1 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
1 authorising AS9844
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
Route objects
4 naming AS9844

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 453 networks and 1,854 prefixes, as published 2026-11-06. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check