Autonomous system
AS9835 GITS-TH-AS-AP Government Information Technology Services
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
Government Information Technology Services (GITS) — Thai government network
government hosting legacy
AS9835 (GITS-TH-AS-AP) is registered to Government Information Technology Services (GITS), the Thai body set up in 1997 under the National Science and Technology Development Agency to build and run the shared Government Information Network (GINet) for the public sector. GITS' functions were subsequently taken over by the Electronic Government Agency, and later by the Digital Government Development Agency (DGA), but the AS still carries the original GITS handle.
What it's used for
The routing evidence is exactly what a shared government-services network looks like. RIS sees 55 IPv4 prefixes carrying about 14,080 addresses, almost all of them individual /24s carved out of a single 164.115.0.0/16 block, plus a 202.139.203.0/24 and five IPv6 /48s. That per-/24 deaggregation is the fingerprint of a central operator handing out one small block per government department or hosted service, and announcing each one separately.
Only four BGP neighbours are observed. A network of this size with four peers is not selling transit to anyone: it buys upstream from a handful of Thai carriers and exists to serve the agencies behind it. Taken together, the shape says GITS is a government service-delivery and hosting network, not an ISP, and not a wholesale carrier.
Notable
- The prefixes come from a single contiguous /16, which is characteristic of an early national-government allocation rather than accreted commercial space.
- The organisation named in the registry no longer exists under that name; Thai government digital services now sit with the DGA.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
5 upstream, 0 downstream and 6 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-20, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 22 prefixes · 14.34K addresses IPv6 5 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| TH | Thailand | 27 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9835- Registry name
- GITS-TH-AS-AP
- Registrant
- National Electronics and Computer Technology Center
- Abuse contact
- noc@thaisarn.net.th
- Registered
- 2008-09-04
- Last changed
- 2020-07-29
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 7% valid · 4 valid, 57 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 5 authorising AS9835
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 98% registered · 60 of 61 announcements 1 other origin
- Route objects
- 504 naming AS9835
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,778 prefixes, as published 2026-10-20. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere