asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9765 VTOPIA-AS-KR VTOPIA

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 8.19K 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KR
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

VTOPIA

South Korea · AI-generated

hosting legacy

AS9765 (VTOPIA-AS-KR) is registered through KRNIC to VTOPIA, a small South Korean operator based in Hanam, Gyeonggi-do. It is a legacy ASN out of the KRNIC block, and what it registers and what it actually announces do not line up. This card describes the routing evidence and stops short of classifying the network, because the two disagree.

What it's used for

RIS shows 8,192 IPv4 addresses in eight /22 prefixes, all of them inside 111.66.192.0–111.66.223.255, with one observed BGP neighbour. None of VTOPIA's own registered Korean space appears in the announcements. The covering 111.66.0.0/16 is not Korean at all: it is registered through APNIC/CNNIC to a network described as being in Dongguan, Guangdong, China. So a Korean-held ASN is originating Chinese-registered address space.

The reverse DNS on that space points somewhere else again. The sampled PTRs are mail-host names on a scatter of unrelated third-party domains — several addresses across different /22s all answer to the same hostname, and others resolve to per-domain mx-style names. Uniform mail-server naming spread evenly across a block, on domains with no relationship to each other or to the registrant, is the shape of hosted or leased mail infrastructure rather than of an operator's own network.

Notable

  • Registrant, address-space registry and reverse DNS point at three different parties. That combination is worth a second look before treating this ASN as a Korean network in any dataset.
  • Do not read the -KR in the handle as describing where the announced addresses are registered. It describes the ASN's registry, nothing more.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS51847Nearoute Limited464

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 8.19K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KRKorea, Republic of1

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS9753 - AS9784
Registered
2017-06-15
Last changed
2017-06-15
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 8 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS9765
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 8 of 8 announcements
Route objects
24 naming AS9765

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 446 networks and 1,852 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check