Autonomous system
AS9755 RPKINET1-KR - Korea Internet Security Agency
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA / KRNIC)
legacy government research
AS9755 (RPKINET1-KR) is held by the Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA), the agency under South Korea's Ministry of Science and ICT that runs KRNIC — the national registry for Korea's IPv4/IPv6 address space and ASNs — and administers the .kr ccTLD. The RPKINET1 handle names the network's purpose: RPKI, the resource public key infrastructure that lets networks cryptographically validate route origins.
What it's used for
The footprint is deliberately minimal: a single IPv4 prefix, 202.30.120.0/24 — 256 addresses — no IPv6 origin, and one observed BGP neighbour. This is not a network with users; it is dedicated registry infrastructure. An AS carved out to carry RPKI services is the same pattern other registries follow: keep the machinery that publishes and validates route-origin authorisations on its own routed block, separate from the rest of the organisation's estate, so its reachability and its RPKI status can be reasoned about independently. The 202.30.0.0/15 range is long-standing Korean academic and infrastructure space, which is where KRNIC's own services have historically been numbered.
Notable
- KISA is the successor to a 2009 merger of the Korea Information Security Agency, the National Internet Development Agency and the Korean IT International Cooperation Agency, which is why one body now covers security response, the number registry and the domain registry.
- A single /24 behind a single neighbour is a very small routing posture for national registry infrastructure. Resilience for RPKI publication comes from repository distribution and validator caching, not from this AS's peering.
- Do not read the tiny size as insignificance. What this network serves is consumed by every Korean operator doing route-origin validation.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS9858 | Korea Internet Security Agency | 63 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-01, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS9755- Registry name
- RPKINET1-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 1999-12-10
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 1 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9755
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 0% registered · 0 of 1 announcements
- Route objects
- 18 naming AS9755
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 447 networks and 1,843 prefixes, as published 2026-11-02. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere