Autonomous system
AS9735 HKDNR-AS-AP Hong Kong Domain Name Registration Co. Ltd
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
Hong Kong Domain Name Registration Company (HKDNR)
legacy enterprise hosting
AS9735 (HKDNR-AS-AP) is held by the Hong Kong Domain Name Registration Company Limited (HKDNR), the wholly-owned registrar subsidiary of HKIRC, the body designated by the Hong Kong government to run the .hk and .香港 country-code top-level domains. This is registry infrastructure, not a service provider network.
What it's used for
The routing evidence matches a ccTLD operator precisely. RIS shows just 2 IPv4 prefixes — 203.119.2.0/24 and 203.119.87.0/24, 512 addresses in total — announced to a single observed neighbour, plus four IPv6 /36s carved out of 2001:dca::/32. Every sampled address has reverse DNS under hkdnr.hk (5-2-int-rev.hkdnr.hk and similar), so the space is used by the registry itself rather than sublet to customers. The single neighbour and the tiny footprint tell you this AS exists so that HKIRC/HKDNR can originate its own address space for name-server and registration-system reachability, with routing independence from any one carrier. The 203.119.0.0/16 range is well known as APNIC-region infrastructure space, which is where regional registry and DNS services are commonly numbered.
Notable
- HKDNR handles the day-to-day registration service; HKIRC is the registry proper. The AS sits with the registrar entity, but the infrastructure serves the
.hknamespace as a whole. - Four IPv6
/36s against two IPv4/24s is an unusually IPv6-heavy allocation, consistent with an organisation that runs authoritative DNS and wants generous, well-separated anycast-capable space. - A single BGP neighbour is a genuinely small routing posture for critical national infrastructure; the resilience for
.hkcomes from DNS-layer distribution rather than from this AS's own peering breadth.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS19551 | Incapsula Inc | 260 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-16, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 512 addresses IPv6 3 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| HK | Hong Kong | 5 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9735- Registry name
- HKDNR-AS-AP
- Registrant
- Hong Kong Domain Name Registration Company Limited
- Abuse contact
- technical@hkdnr.hk
- Registered
- 2008-09-04
- Last changed
- 2020-07-08
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 6 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9735
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 6 of 6 announcements
- Route objects
- 13 naming AS9735
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,783 prefixes, as published 2026-10-17. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere