Autonomous system
AS9732 SCIG-AS-AP Digital Policy Office, HKSARG
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
Digital Policy Office, HKSAR Government
legacy government enterprise
AS9732 (SCIG-AS-AP) is the Hong Kong SAR Government's own autonomous system, registered today to the Digital Policy Office. The DPO was formed in July 2024 by merging the Office of the Government Chief Information Officer (OGCIO) with the Efficiency Office, and it inherited OGCIO's networks — which is why older sources still attribute this AS to OGCIO.
What it's used for
This is a government enterprise network, not a service provider. RIS shows 8 IPv4 prefixes covering 14,336 addresses and a single IPv6 /32 (2406::/32), announced to 8 observed neighbours. The v4 space is a mix of legacy and modern APNIC allocations: a 202.128.224.0/19 aggregate alongside several /22s from 220.232.0.0, 103.214.76.0, 45.119.92.0 and 45.127.0.0. Eight neighbours on fourteen thousand addresses is the classic multi-homed-enterprise profile — the government buys transit and peering from a small set of Hong Kong carriers for resilience, and originates its own space so that a single carrier outage cannot take public services offline. There is no downstream customer cone and nothing that looks like an access network.
Notable
- The AS carries HKSARG's internet-facing presence: public-facing government services and the gateway through which departmental networks reach the public internet.
- Holding a full IPv6
/32is unusual for an organisation of this address size and reflects an early, policy-driven IPv6 allocation rather than deployment scale. - The registry name changed with a machinery-of-government reorganisation, not a change of network operator. The network is the same one OGCIO ran.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Hong Kong Internet Exchange | Hong Kong, China | 123.255.92.22 |
Transit providers
6 upstream, 0 downstream and 8 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS9381 | HKBN Enterprise Solutions HK Limited | 388 |
| AS45474 | Nexusguard Pte. Ltd. | 58 |
| AS9304 | HGC Global Communications Limited | 26 |
| AS4635 | Hong Kong Internet Exchange--Route Server 1 | 14 |
| AS24482 | SG.GS | 8 |
| AS9930 | TIME dotCom Berhad No. 14, Jalan Majistret U1/26 Hicom Glenmarie Industrial Park 40150 Shah Alam Selangor, Malaysia | 7 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 12 prefixes · 14.34K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| HK | Hong Kong | 13 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9732- Registry name
- SCIG-AS-AP
- Registrant
- Digital Policy Office
- Abuse contact
- opa3cis@scig.gov.hk
- Registered
- 2008-09-04
- Last changed
- 2025-05-08
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 9 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 9 authorising AS9732
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 9 of 9 announcements
- Route objects
- 277 naming AS9732
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-15. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere