asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9708 PKNU-AS Pukyong National University

Education ARIN

IPv4 addresses 28.16K 24 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KR
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Pukyong National University

South Korea · AI-generated

university education legacy

AS9708 (pknu-as) is held by Pukyong National University, a national university in Busan, South Korea. It is the university's campus network, connected to the rest of the internet through a single upstream.

What it's used for

The shape is a campus network of respectable size. RIS sees 28 IPv4 prefixes carrying 28,160 addresses, no IPv6, and 1 observed neighbour. A single upstream rules out any transit or provider role, and 28,000 addresses is the sort of estate a national university accumulates to give routable space to faculties, labs, administrative systems, dormitories and student wireless. The prefix list is unusually heterogeneous for a university: alongside the expected academic-range blocks (210.119.0.0/20 and its /22 pieces, 210.125.112.0/20, 210.107.208.0/22, 203.250.120.0/21) sit /20s and /24s out of Korean consumer-provider space such as 14.44.112.0/20, 112.162.6-7, 121.174.96.0/24 and 220.66.243.0/24. That mix says the university has picked up address space from several sources over a long period rather than sitting on one clean allocation.

Notable

  • Pukyong National University was formed by the merger of two Busan institutions and retains a strong fisheries, marine science and engineering orientation.
  • Korean university networks of this era commonly connect through the national research network rather than through commercial transit, which fits the single observed neighbour.

Interesting

Two sampled addresses in 58.103.160.0/21 return the PTR localhost. That is a stock misconfiguration: a reverse zone left with a default record instead of real host names, and it tends to persist for years because nothing user-visible breaks.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS4766Korea Telecom1,736

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 24 prefixes · 28.16K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KRKorea, Republic of24

Registry

Allocation record

ARIN · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
ARIN
Handle
AS9708
Registry name
pknu-as-KR
Abuse contact
hostmaster@nic.or.kr
Registered
1999-10-05
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 29 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS9708
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 29 of 29 announcements
Route objects
94 naming AS9708

Reputation

Classification and threat

Education University, school or national research and education network.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check