Autonomous system
AS9695 KOEXP-AS-KR KISTI
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information (KISTI)
research education government legacy
AS9695 (KOEXP-AS-KR) is registered to KISTI, the Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information: the government-funded research institute in Daejeon that supplies national science and technology information services, supercomputing, and the KREONET research backbone.
What it's used for
This is a small, purpose-built research allocation rather than a general-purpose network. RIS sees just 4 IPv4 prefixes totalling 1,280 addresses, no IPv6, and a single observed neighbour. One upstream and four prefixes is the profile of a network that exists to host a specific set of institutional services and reach the rest of the internet through its parent, not to provide connectivity to anyone else. All four prefixes sit inside 210.110.0.0/16, the block long associated with Korea's academic and research networking, and they span 210.110.199.0/24 through 210.110.203.0/24, which is what a single delegated slice out of a larger research allocation looks like. KISTI's much larger production research network is carried elsewhere, so this AS should be read as one of the institute's smaller specialised networks rather than as KREONET itself.
Notable
- KISTI operates under South Korea's Ministry of Science and ICT and runs national platforms including NTIS, the national R&D information service, alongside high-performance computing resources for Korean researchers.
- Its networking arm is best known for KREONET, the national research and education network, and for its role in international research-network exchange with peers in Asia, Europe and North America.
- Despite the small size, a network in this space is far more likely to be carrying research or institutional traffic than anything commercial.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS1237 | KISTI | 248 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-18, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 1.28K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 2 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9695- Registry name
- KOEXP-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 1999-10-05
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 75% valid · 3 valid, 1 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 5 authorising AS9695
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 75% registered · 3 of 4 announcements
- Route objects
- 12 naming AS9695
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,784 prefixes, as published 2026-10-19. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere