asn.dev

Routing security

AS9687 Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology

Unclassified APNIC

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 15 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 15 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

15 observed

Every prefix observed with AS9687 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
124.21.64.0/20No ROAIRR53
124.21.64.0/22No ROAIRR52
124.21.68.0/22No ROAIRR52
124.21.72.0/22No ROAIRR52
124.21.76.0/22No ROAIRR52
124.21.128.0/20No ROAIRR53
124.21.128.0/22No ROAIRR52
124.21.132.0/22No ROAIRR52
124.21.136.0/22No ROAIRR52
124.21.140.0/22No ROAIRR52
124.21.192.0/20No ROAIRR53
124.21.192.0/22No ROAIRR52
124.21.196.0/22No ROAIRR52
124.21.200.0/22No ROAIRR52
124.21.204.0/22No ROAIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS9687 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

17 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS9687 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
210.107.128.0/20RADBInformation and Communications UniversityMAINT-AS47662023-11-13Not announced
220.69.176.0/20RADBInformation and Communications UniversityMAINT-AS47662023-11-13Not announced
124.21.64.0/20RADB—MAINT-AS4000182026-10-27Announced
124.21.64.0/22RADBCustomer PrefixMAINT-AS4000182026-10-30Announced
124.21.68.0/22RADBCustomer PrefixMAINT-AS4000182026-10-30Announced
124.21.72.0/22RADBCustomer PrefixMAINT-AS4000182026-10-30Announced
124.21.76.0/22RADBCustomer PrefixMAINT-AS4000182026-10-30Announced
124.21.128.0/20RADB—MAINT-AS4000182026-10-27Announced
124.21.128.0/22RADBCustomer PrefixMAINT-AS4000182026-10-30Announced
124.21.132.0/22RADBCustomer PrefixMAINT-AS4000182026-10-30Announced
124.21.136.0/22RADBCustomer PrefixMAINT-AS4000182026-10-30Announced
124.21.140.0/22RADBCustomer PrefixMAINT-AS4000182026-10-30Announced
124.21.192.0/20RADB—MAINT-AS4000182026-10-27Announced
124.21.192.0/22RADBCustomer PrefixMAINT-AS4000182026-10-30Announced
124.21.196.0/22RADBCustomer PrefixMAINT-AS4000182026-10-30Announced
124.21.200.0/22RADBCustomer PrefixMAINT-AS4000182026-10-30Announced
124.21.204.0/22RADBCustomer PrefixMAINT-AS4000182026-10-30Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS9687 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-KORNETBGPRADBLists AS9687 as a direct member
AS210528:AS-KOREARIPELists AS9687 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-14 16:19 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-14. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.