Autonomous system
AS9664 SATPL-AS-AP SOUTHEAST ASIA TELECOMSG PTE. LTD.
Unclassified APNIC Cable/DSL/ISP
Summary
Southeast Asia Telecom (SG)
isp residential legacy
AS9664 (SATPL-AS-AP) is held by SOUTHEAST ASIA TELECOM (SG) PTE. LTD., a Singapore-registered telecoms company associated with the SEATEL group, which holds mobile and ISP interests around the ASEAN region. The AS behaves as an eyeball network: its address space carries residential fibre subscribers, not transit or hosting.
What it's used for
The IPv4 footprint is almost vestigial and the IPv6 footprint is not. RIS sees 3 IPv4 prefixes totalling 1,024 addresses against 19 IPv6 prefixes — mostly /36s out of 2401:f1e0::/36 and 2400:9ce0::/36, plus a 2001:df3:3fc0::/48 — announced through 18 observed neighbours.
That inversion is the interesting part. A residential ISP starting from a 1,024-address IPv4 base cannot give every subscriber a public v4 address, so the v4 space serves gateways and infrastructure behind carrier-grade NAT while customers get real IPv6. Sampled reverse DNS on 163.61.198.0/24 returns names of the form 163-61-198-5.home-fiber.auk.sg — the per-subscriber naming of a home-fibre product marketed in Singapore under the AUK brand, living inside this AS's space.
The prefixes are geographically split: two Singapore blocks and 162.4.174.0/23, which is registered against Cambodia. That is consistent with a group holding operations in more than one ASEAN market rather than with a scattered, unrelated inventory.
Notable
- Nineteen IPv6 prefixes to three IPv4 ones is the routing profile of an operator that built for v6 because it never had enough v4 to build otherwise.
- Eighteen neighbours on a small address count is peering breadth, not transit scale; the traffic terminates at subscribers.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
6 upstream, 1 downstream and 11 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-16, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 3 prefixes · 1.02K addresses IPv6 19 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| SG | Singapore | 22 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9664- Registry name
- SATPL-AS-AP
- Registrant
- SOUTHEAST ASIA TELECOM(SG) PTE. LTD.
- Abuse contact
- noc@auk.sg
- Registered
- 2025-03-17
- Last changed
- 2025-03-17
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- AUK Telecom(SG)
- Network type
- Cable/DSL/ISP
- Scope
- Not Disclosed
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
- Peering policy
- Open
- IRR as-set
APNIC::AS9664:AS-AUKSG- Present at
- 2 exchanges
- Facilities
- 1 facilities
- Website
- https://auk.sg/
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 22 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 9 authorising AS9664
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 22 of 22 announcements
- Route objects
- 58 naming AS9664
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,783 prefixes, as published 2026-10-17. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere