Autonomous system
AS9637 KBSI-AS-KR Korea Basic Science Institute
Education APNIC
Summary
Korea Basic Science Institute (KBSI)
research education government legacy
AS9637 (KBSI-AS-KR) is held by the Korea Basic Science Institute (한국기초과학지원연구원), a government-funded research institute headquartered in Daejeon. KBSI's mandate is to operate large shared research instruments — mass spectrometers, electron microscopes, NMR and similar facilities — and make them available to researchers across the country, so it runs sites in several cities as well as the Daejeon headquarters.
What it's used for
The routing evidence looks like a research institute and nothing else. RIS sees 7 IPv4 prefixes carrying 4,864 addresses, no IPv6, and only 1 observed neighbour. That combination — a substantial address count behind a single upstream — is the classic shape of an organisation homed on a national research-and-education network. A commercial network with nearly 5,000 addresses would multi-home; an institute that reaches the world through a single NREN link does not need to, because that link is its connection to the research community it serves.
The prefixes are also larger and better aggregated than the /24 confetti seen at most enterprises in this range: a /21 at 203.253.240.0, a /22 at 210.125.80.0, two /23s and three /24s. Blocks of that size are what get handed to institutions with real internal networks — instrument control systems, data-acquisition hosts, analysis clusters, and staff and visiting-researcher LANs at multiple regional centres. The 203.x and 210.x ranges are long-standing Korean academic space, consistent with an institute that has held its addressing for a long time.
Notable
- KBSI is part of Korea's government research-institute system and is a facility operator, so its network carries instruments and data as much as it carries people.
- Single upstream despite nearly 5,000 addresses, the signature of an NREN-connected institution rather than a commercial one.
- No IPv6 announced.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS1237 | KISTI | 476 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 7 prefixes · 4.86K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 7 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9637- Registry name
- KBSI-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 1999-08-18
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 7 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9637
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 7 of 7 announcements
- Route objects
- 34 naming AS9637
Reputation
Classification and threat
Education University, school or national research and education network.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere