asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9627 TCR-AP TCR Holdings Ltd

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 30.98K 32 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly AU
Exchanges 1 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 1 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

TCR Holdings Ltd

Australia · AI-generated

isp enterprise hosting legacy

AS9627 (TCR-AP) is held by TCR Holdings Ltd, an Australian telecommunications and hosting company registered in New South Wales. It sits behind Australian upstreams (AAPT and Vocus) and provides addressing and connectivity to a set of downstream service brands and business customers rather than operating a single mass-market network of its own.

What it's used for

The footprint is small and heavily fragmented: 72 announced IPv4 prefixes for just 31,488 addresses, with the largest a single /19 (202.9.224.0/19) and the rest a long tail of /21s, /22s, /23s and /24s spread across 202.3, 202.9, 202.182, 116.193, 122.252 and 220.247. No IPv6 is announced. Only 3 BGP neighbours are observed, so this is a customer network buying transit, not a carrier selling it.

The reverse DNS is the notable part. Sampled addresses resolve under several different organisations' domains at once: static.tcrholdings.com and user.tcrholdings.com (the holder's own), edge.w3networks.com.au and static.alphacall.com.au (two separate Australian ISP brands), and 202-3-56-5.worley.org.au (an unrelated third party). The space is therefore assigned out to distinct downstream operators and enterprise customers, each running its own naming, while TCR Holdings originates the routes.

Notable

  • The static. and user. labels dominate the sample, which points at fixed business allocations rather than a dynamic residential pool.
  • All the address space is APNIC-region, and every PTR maps back to an identifiable Australian operator. This is a related-party provider group with real downstream networks, not scattered inventory.
  • TCR Holdings also appears against a second, separately registered ASN, so routing for the group is split across more than one AS.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
Megaport IX SydneySydney, Australia103.26.69.81

Transit providers

2 upstream, 1 downstream and 3 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS4826Vocus Connect International Backbone3,835
AS2764AAPT Limited295

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-27, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 32 prefixes · 30.98K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
AUAustralia32

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS9627
Registry name
TCR-AP
Registrant
TCR Holdings Ltd
Abuse contact
keith@tcrholdings.com
Registered
2008-09-04
Last changed
2020-08-06
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 70 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS9627
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
81% registered · 57 of 70 announcements 4 other origin
Route objects
210 naming AS9627

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 446 networks and 1,852 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check