asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9597 CPI-NET KDDI Web Communications Inc.

Hosting RIPE

IPv4 addresses 277K 20 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly JP
Exchanges 2 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 7 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

KDDI Web Communications (CPI)

Japan · AI-generated

hosting legacy

AS9597 (CPI-NET) is held by KDDI Web Communications Inc., the KDDI-group web-services subsidiary whose flagship product is CPI, a business-oriented rental server and managed hosting platform aimed at Japanese enterprises, government sites and web production agencies.

What it's used for

This is a hosting network. RIS shows 26 IPv4 prefixes covering 276,736 addresses, a single IPv6 /32 (2402:3d00::/32), and 19 observed neighbours. The combination is the tell: a quarter of a million addresses packed into 26 large, clean blocks — two /16s (150.60.0.0/16, 194.91.0.0/16), a /17, then /18s, /19s and /20s — with a peering count in the teens. Server estates look like this. They consume address space densely, announce it as whole allocations rather than per-site /24s, and connect to a modest set of upstreams and exchange peers because they sell hosting, not transit.

The sampled reverse DNS agrees. 194.91.0.5 and 27.34.128.5 resolve to hbbkup01.secure.ne.jp and rcweb02.secure.ne.jp; secure.ne.jp is CPI's own operational domain, used for its control panel and customer portals, and names like rcweb02 and hbbkup01 read as shared-web and backup infrastructure rather than subscriber lines.

Notable

  • The 194.91.0.0/16 is a RIPE-region legacy block sitting inside an otherwise entirely APNIC-region footprint — a long-held allocation carried into a Japanese hosting estate.
  • Distinguish this AS from KDDI's own carrier networks. This is the group's web-hosting arm, and the AS describes a server estate, not KDDI's eyeball or mobile network.
  • CPI is a long-running Japanese business hosting brand, positioned around shared and dedicated rental servers for corporate, e-commerce and public-sector websites.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 2 exchanges in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
BroadBand Internet eXchange TokyoTokyo, Japan101.203.90.127
JPIX TokyoTokyo, Japan210.171.225.110

Transit providers

7 upstream, 0 downstream and 12 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS2497Internet Initiative Japan Inc.595
AS2516KDDI CORPORATION495
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC232
AS17676SoftBank Corp.166
AS17639Converge ICT Solutions Inc.27
AS24482SG.GS27
AS20485Joint Stock Company TransTeleCom26

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 20 prefixes · 277K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
JPJapan21

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS9597
Registry name
CPI-NET
Registered
1999-08-05
Last changed
2016-10-12
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
96% valid · 26 valid, 1 with no ROA
ROAs
20 authorising AS9597
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 27 of 27 announcements
Route objects
23 naming AS9597

Reputation

Classification and threat

Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check