asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9484 MOBINET-AS-MN Mobinet LLC. AS Mobinet Internet Service Provider

Unclassified APNIC NSP

IPv4 addresses 20.99K 10 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly MN
Exchanges 1 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 5 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Mobinet LLC

Mongolia · AI-generated

isp residential transit legacy

AS9484 (MOBINET-AS-MN) is held by Mobinet LLC, a Mongolian internet service provider based in Ulaanbaatar. Despite the name it is a fixed-line/fibre ISP, not a mobile carrier: Mobinet sells broadband and IP services to Mongolian businesses and consumers.

What it's used for

The AS originates 9 IPv4 prefixes carrying 20,992 addresses, plus one IPv6 allocation (2407:6400::/32). The v4 holding is a mix of two legacy /19s (202.21.96.0/19, 202.131.224.0/19) and a scattering of smaller, more recently issued blocks (45.117.32.0/22, 103.168.34.0/23, 162.4.128.0/23, 138.252.28.0/23). That pattern is typical of a long-lived regional ISP that got a comfortable legacy allocation early and has since had to top up in /22s and /23s as APNIC's free pool ran down.

Seven observed BGP neighbours puts it squarely in the "small national ISP" band: enough peers and upstreams to have redundant international transit and some direct peering, but nowhere near the hundreds-to-thousands a wholesale carrier would show. Mongolia is landlocked, so its ISPs buy international capacity through Chinese and Russian terrestrial routes; a handful of upstream relationships and a couple of exchange sessions is exactly what that produces.

Notable

  • Mobinet is one of Mongolia's larger private ISPs and serves enterprise segments (banking, mining, government) alongside consumer broadband.
  • The address holding is small in absolute terms; a network this size in Mongolia serves a real subscriber base only with heavy NAT.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
MISPA internet exchange pointUlaanbaatar, Mongolia103.8.60.26

Transit providers

1 upstream, 5 downstream and 7 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS55805MobiCom Corporation559

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-27, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 10 prefixes · 20.99K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
MNMongolia11

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS9484
Registry name
MOBINET-AS-MN
Registrant
Mobinet LLC
Abuse contact
network_td@mobinet.mn
Registered
2008-09-04
Last changed
2021-10-22
Allocation
allocated

Declared

PeeringDB profile

self-reported
Name
Mobinet
Also known as
mobinet
Network type
NSP
Scope
Asia Pacific
Traffic ratio
Balanced
Peering policy
Open
IRR as-set
AS-9484
Website
https://www.mobinet.mn

PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 10 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
87 authorising AS9484
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 10 of 10 announcements
Route objects
191 naming AS9484

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 446 networks and 1,852 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check